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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY BASED ON
ADOLESCENT BRAIN IMAGING TECHNOLOGY IN THE
PROSECUTION OF JUVENILES: How FAIRNESS AND
NEUROSCIENCE OVERCOME THE EVIDENTIARY OBSTACLES TO
ALLOW FOR APPLICATION OF A MODIFIED COMMON LAW
INFANCY DEFENSE
Sally Terry Green
Adolescent brain imaging technology is an evolving area of
science that reveals levels of maturity in the adolescent brain. Its
potential effect on criminally culpable behavior is the source of
extensive debate. The technology can inform judges and jurors on
essential differences between how adults make decisions regarding
their conduct as distinct from adolescents. United States Supreme
Court precedence provides a relevant framework from which we
can extrapolate fairness principles and their operation in
developing a meaningful juvenile defense under which the
technology can be considered. These principles should guide
decisions made by the trial courts under the states' applicable
rules of evidence regarding the admissibility of scientific data like
adolescent brain imaging technology. Admitting the technology
and expert witness testimony in the context of an Infancy Defense
model provides the fact finder with the data necessary to make a
more in depth determination of adolescent criminal capacity.
Most Infancy Defense statutes currently implemented by the
states create a gap comprised offourteen to eighteen-year-olds by
failing to address this population of adolescents whose deficiencies
in judgment and decision-making pose the most credible argument
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for criminal exoneration. Offering adolescent brain research as
part of an Infancy Defense model provides juveniles with an
opportunity to combat harsher penalties imposed by the states and
facilitates imposition of legal standards that require consideration
of the differences between children and adults. If juvenile
offenders are to be truly considered less blameworthy than adults,
preservation of the Infancy Defense is crucial. This is true even
when they should be held accountable for their actions. By
allowing the juvenile offenders to offer expert witness testimony
based on adolescent brain imaging as part of the meaningful
defense, the fact-finder can more fairly assess adolescents'
decision-making capacity. Consequently, we must allow the
admissibility of adolescent brain imaging in order to guard against
overestimation of an adolescents' criminal culpability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The morning and evening news is littered with news of
adolescent casualties. Although not always the loss of life that we
usually expect to hear on the news, oftentimes the stories involve
extreme acts of violence committed by adolescents with ensuing
outrage from the adult community. Consider when one
adolescent's conduct incites the emotion and misjudgment of
another. Wayne Treacy did not expect that his life would
potentially come to an end when he received a nasty text message
from his girlfriend's cohort.' After all, he was already trying to
cope with and grieve the recent suicide of his older brother.2 The
nasty text message erupted an unmanageable and, arguably,
untenable response in Wayne causing him to beat Josie Lou Ratley
so horribly that she currently fights to regain normal daily
function. Undoubtedly, Josie's adolescent years of life before the
beating are immeasurably altered-adolescent casualty number
' Rafael A. Olmeda, Teen charged as adult in beating of Deerfield girl, THE
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one.4
Wayne Treacy is being tried as an adult in a Florida criminal
court on the charge of first degree attempted murder.' The fifteen-
year-old juvenile defendant faces the potential consequence of life
without parole-adolescent casualty number two. 6  While
adolescents make poor decisions every day, rarely do their
judgments amount to the events described in this recent Florida
case. One psychologist compares the adolescent brain to that of a
toddler-"unstable, dysfunctional and completely unpredictable."'
In the face of impulsivity and poor judgment, our criminal justice
system can address cases like the one in Florida by, first and
foremost, considering the decision-making function of the juvenile
defendants like Wayne Treacy as that of an adolescent.
No one truly knows whether Wayne Treacy intended to
mercilessly beat Josie Lou Ratley. A child may intend to commit
an act but is frequently not capable of grasping the consequences
of his actions or differentiating between right and wrong behavior.'
4 id.
5 id.
6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.051 (LexisNexis 2007) states:
Attempted felony murder. (1) Any person who perpetrates or attempts
to perpetrate any felony enumerated in § 782.04(3) and who commits,
aids, or abets an intentional act that is not an essential element of the
felony and that could, but does not, cause the death of another commits
a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of
years not exceeding life, or as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or
§ 775.084, which is an offense ranked in level 9 of the Criminal
Punishment Code. Victim injury points shall be scored under this
subsection.
Id.
7 MICHAEL J. BRADLEY, YES, YOUR TEEN IS CRAZY!: LOVING YOUR KID
WITHOUT LOSING YOUR MIND 8 (2003) (attributing neurological deficiency as
the cause for impulsivity and lack of appreciation for likely outcomes of their
actions).
See Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is
the Preadolescent's Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 189
(2000) (discussing the undeveloped pre-adolescents' limited reasoning and
inability to contemplate or appreciate the irreversibility of their potential
criminal behavior).
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Admitting expert witness testimony of adolescent brain imaging
technology under a modified Infancy Defense allows for
preventing more adolescent "casualties."
A. The "Meaningful" Infancy Defense Model
Early in the fifth century, Roman law provided that children
under seven could not form criminal intent or malice.' English
common law in the thirteenth century allowed a pardon for
juvenile criminals which later evolved into a presumption against
young offenders' criminal liability.'o In the seventeenth century,
the common law provided a rebuttable presumption of criminality
for fourteen-year-olds." Those older than fourteen were liable as
adults. 2 By the eighteenth century, the prosecution had to prove
that the accused understood the wrongfulness of his act in order to
rebut the presumption of incapacity." The common law Infancy
Defense erupted in the American colonies as a result. 4
A few states codified the defense in their first penal codes."
By the twentieth century, reformers were advocating for
youngsters to be "treated" rather than punished. 6 Even still,
advocates in jurisdictions like California encourage progressive
juvenile justice policies with an eye toward modem science that
regards teenagers as less culpable than adults." The common law
defense or a modified version is available in forty-five states." On
the other hand, five states have modified the Infancy Defense by
9Barbara Kaban, Revitalizing the Infancy Defense in the Contemporary




" Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy
Defense, 54 U. KAN. L. REv 687, 711 (2006).
14 Kaban, supra note 9, at 37.
5 Id.
16 Kaban, supra note 9, at 37.
1 See Ashley N. Johndro, Thwarting California's Presumptive L WOP Penalty
For Adolescents: Psychology's and Neuroscience's Message for the Cahfornia
Justice System, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 341, 360 (2009-20 10).
8 Carter, supra note 13, at 733.
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lowering the age of presumed incapacity from fourteen to twelve.'9
Unfortunately, the desired rehabilitative models for juvenile
dispositions have deteriorated in the face of harsher penalties
imposed by the states. 20 A modified Infancy Defense model allows
juvenile and adult courts to consider standards for imposing
criminal culpability with comprehensive understanding of the
cognitive context under which adolescents make decisions. For as
long as we choose to prosecute juvenile offenders for their actions
as if they are adults, we must allow adolescent brain imaging to be
part of a meaningful defense so that we can fully comprehend the
adolescent mind upon which criminal sanction is imposed.
B. The Infancy Defense, Adolescent Brain Technology and U.S.
Supreme Court Precedence
Adolescent brain imaging technology is an evolving area of
science that reveals levels of maturity in the adolescent brain and
its effect on criminally culpable behavior.2' Under the law, we
have historically treated children in our American criminal justice
system differently than adults because they were viewed as
cognitively and emotionally immature.22 The United States
19 Id.
20 Sara Sun Beale, You've Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile
Justice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 511,
514 (2009) (describing one example of harsher penalties that was observed by
the author when one of the Jena six was prosecuted by the Louisiana District
Attorney's office as an adult for attempted second degree murder. The author
reflects on this case as raising questions concerning the dwindling boundaries
between the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems and the applicability of
harsher sanctions to juvenile offenders especially when racial imagery and
racially based politics led to enactment of the "tough on crime" legislation).
21 See generally Tracy Rightmer, Arrested Development: Juveniles'Immature
Brains Make Them Less Culpable Than Adults, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 1
(2005).
22 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (substantiating the
argument made here in favor of the admissibility of adolescent brain imaging
technology because the highest court continues to recognize the scientific
conclusions made about the adolescent brain and to make rules of law
accordingly. If the trend of the Supreme Court is to utilize the scientific
conclusions from brain science as somewhat dispositive on the issue of legal
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
Supreme Court recently heard arguments made in two consolidated
Florida cases challenging the sentencing of juveniles to life
without parole.23 In the past, juvenile offenders in some
jurisdictions have been subject to imposition of life without
parole. 24 The arguments put forth in the Florida cases refuted life
without parole in non-homicide cases and highlighted arguments of
diminished culpability and maturity which were successfully
asserted in Roper v. Simmons.25 Recently, on May 17, 2010, the
Supreme Court determined that juvenile life without parole
sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. 26 The Court followed its reasoning in Roper closely
and referenced the limited culpability of juveniles and how
developments in brain science illustrate juveniles' continuous
maturation process past adolescence.2 7
Offering adolescent brain research as part of an Infancy
Defense28 model provides juveniles with an opportunity to combat
culpability for juveniles, then the admissibility of adolescent brain
imaging becomes even more compelling. The Infancy Defense model discussed
in this article provides a suggested framework for considering the evidence);
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
23 Graham v. Florida, 982 So.2d 43 (Fla. App. I Dist. 2008), cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009); Sullivan v. Florida, 987 So.2d 83 (Fla. App. 1 Dist.
2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009). Petitioners in the cases argue
violation of their protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.
24 Juvenile offenders between the ages of thirteen and fifteen were subject to
life without parole for first time criminal offenses. Lauren Fine, Death Behind
Bars: Examining Juvenile Life Without Parole in Sullivan v. Florida and
Graham v. Florida, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L & PUB. POL'Y SIDEBAR 24, 25-26
(2009).
25 543 U.S. at 552, 569-572. The court found that there are three general
differences between juveniles and adults that establish the juvenile's diminished
culpability: (1) a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,
(2) a vulnerability or susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressures,
(3) a transitory and less fixed personality. Id.
26 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
27 id
28 See Kaban, supra note 9, at 35 (explaining the history of societal treatment
of children as thinking and acting differently than adults, thereby justifying a
6 [VOL. 12: 1
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harsher penalties imposed by the states and facilitates imposition
of legal standards that require consideration of the differences
between children and adults in making moral judgments.29 Our
criminal law system considers whether the accused acted out of
free will and whether the punishment is legitimate.30 We punish
individuals for wrongful acts if they understand the nature of their
conduct, and in many states, if they are capable of controlling their
impulses.' When punishing adolescents, we must consider
developmental research studies that identify three stages of child
development and capacity: (1) children under seven who lack
capacities to be culpable, (2) mid-childhood children who are
unlikely to have that capacity, and (3) adolescents who are usually
regarded as having less capacity than adults.3 2 This article asserts
that the Infancy Defense provides a legal framework for
considering the relevant scientific data and the graduated model of
capacity under which children make decisions. The defense allows
for an adjudicatory and prosecutorial process that reflects our
knowledge of childhood development.
Information provided by brain imaging technology on the
juvenile offenders' brain function can be offered through use of
expert witness testimony, which should be admitted to establish the
juvenile's inability to cognitively appreciate and process the
wrongfulness of juveniles' conduct. Expert testimony is necessary
to bolster juvenile defendants' arguments that the normal genetic
structure of their adolescent brains supports exculpation over
contrary arguments asserted by the prosecution. Such testimony
would corroborate already existing evidence in support of the
juvenile's defense by showing deficient judgment, decision
making, and irresponsibility-all relevant evidence to a modified
Infancy Defense asserted by a juvenile defendant.
presumption of incapacity in order to avoid punishing children because of their
youth).
29 Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 503, 539 (1984).
30 d.
31Id.
32 Id. at 543.
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During the past decade, several commentators have examined
the progression of scientific brain imaging technology and its use
in the courtroom.3 3 Quite expectedly, critics have identified
specific problems with using this technology under our current
legal standards.34 While the technology evolves, it appears that the
current state of brain imaging has limited utility in the courtroom
in light of deep concerns regarding the complexities of the brain
and qualitative conclusions asserted by litigants during the
adversarial process."5 Nevertheless, the U. S. Supreme Court made
specific conclusions about the underdevelopment of the adolescent
brain in the landmark Roper decision that provides constitutional
protection from execution for those under the age of eighteen.36
This population of juvenile offenders is still subjected to
prosecution in adult criminal courts where harsh sentencing
schemes can result.3 7 Unfortunately, most Infancy Defense statutes
33 See Kristen Gartman Rogers & Alan DuBois, The Present and Future
Impact ofNeuroscience Evidence on Criminal Law, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 2009,
at 18; See generally Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L 397 (2006); Terry A.
Maroney, The False Promise ofAdolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009).
34 See Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV.
917, 921 (2009). The author chronicles problems with case precedent like
Roper, but argues that despite the tentative nature and unsettled meaning of
adolescent brain research, "a new standard of the 'reasonable adolescent' should
be created on the basis of the scientific and sociological understanding of teen
brain anatomy and behavior." Id. at 921. See also Jay D. Aronson, Brain
Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCH. PUB. POL. AND
L. 115, 134 (2007) (identifying critics' attacks on the lack of knowledge about
normal brain structure and flawed experiments and concludes that the
technology fails to offer strong enough evidence).
3s Aronson, supra note 34, at 134.
36 See Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
3 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.556 (LexisNexis 2007) (allowing the court to
exercise an involuntary mandatory waiver if the child was fourteen years of age
or older and the adjudication was for the commission of, attempt to commit, or
conspiracy to commit crimes such as murder, carjacking, or aggravated assault);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.10 (LexisNexis 2002) (requiring a transfer to
adult criminal courts if the child was fourteen-years-old at the time of the act,
was previously adjudicated delinquent, and remained in the custody of the
8 [VOL. 12: 1
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currently implemented by the states create a gap comprised of
fourteen to eighteen year olds by failing to address this population
of adolescents whose deficiencies in judgment and decision
making pose the most credible argument for criminal
exoneration.38
A modified Infancy Defense model proposed here does not
presume the incapacity of the juvenile defendant, thereby
eliminating the burden of proof on the prosecution to establish that
the juvenile cognitively understood the wrongfulness of his
actions. Instead, the juvenile defendant can offer expert witness
testimony based on adolescent brain imaging technology" to
inform the trier of fact as to the extent and function of the brain on
the issue of cognitive awareness of wrongful activity. The expert
witness testimony would be subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution, thereby subjecting the conclusions to the adversarial
process. The goal of the adversarial process in this context would
be to seek truth about the adolescent's conduct and to decide what
levels of culpability apply. The testimony allows for fair
consideration of the developmental deficiencies under which the
adolescent offender operates.
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on principles of fairness, its
opinions that set forth methods for admitting expert witness
testimony, and relevant state court decisions illustrate how the
proposed Infancy Defense model can operate. The time has come
department of youth services); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134 (2006) (allowing
the transfer of children sixteen years of age and younger if the child was charged
with crimes such as first degree murder, rape, aggravated robbery, or
kidnapping); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West 1999) (giving the court
discretion to transfer a child fourteen years of age or older if the alleged crime
committed was a felony, but requires a transfer if the child had been transferred
previously and the alleged crime was a felony).
38 See Kaban, supra note 9, at 50.
39 See C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent
Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 659, 709
(2005). Neuroscientific research supports the decreased frontal lobe brain
development associated with critical judgment. Additional factors such as the
surge of hormonal development that takes place in adolescence and increased
levels of excitability in the brain are relevant to adolescent function. Id.
FALL 20101 9
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where science and the law converge at a place where the issue of
preservation and investment in our "most valuable natural
resource"40 is becoming increasingly crucial. This article suggests
that the evolution of scientific methodologies should sculpt the
lens through which we view children's legal culpability and
permissible means of exoneration. It seeks to challenge the legal
system to expand its examination of children's mental capacity
through the admissibility of adolescent neuroscience and its
technologies during trials.
Accordingly, Part II provides an introduction to the Infancy
Defense, adolescent brain imaging, and the U.S. Supreme Court
precedence in support of its admissibility. Part III discusses the
historical treatment of children in our criminal justice system to
illustrate how principles of fairness have established a trend that
acknowledges the significant differences between adults and
children. This Part ultimately establishes the foundation for an
argument in favor of admitting adolescent brain technology as
required under principles of fundamental fairness. Part IV briefly
explains the adolescent brain imaging technology and its
conclusions. Part V examines the existing evidentiary rule
standard for the admissibility of scientific data as put forth under
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals4 1 and the states' analogous application of the
standard.42 Finally, Part VI sets forth a model of operation of the
modified Infancy Defense in the context of recent state Infancy
Defense case law.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND
PRINCIPLES OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
Supreme Court precedence spanning three decades reflects a
trend toward differing treatment of children under the law, as
40 Herbert Hoover Quotes, THINKExIST.COM, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/
children are our most-valuable-natural/185122.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2010).
4 1 509 U.S. 579 (1993).42 Id. at 588.
[OL. 12: 110
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indicated by principles of fundamental fairness and due process.43
Concepts of fundamental fairness in offering expert witness
testimony as part of a criminal defense also pervade the U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence where an indigent defendant must be
provided with expert psychiatrist assistance." In the landmark Ake
v. Oklahoma opinion, the Court held that "fundamental fairness
entitles indigent defendants to an adequate opportunity to present
their claims fairly within the adversary system."45 The same
43 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that the D.C.
juvenile court statutory waiver process required a "full investigation" by the
judge must include a hearing whereby specific determinative factors are
reviewed and listed as a statement of reasons for why the juvenile is transferred
into adult criminal court); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) (holding, one year
after Kent, that juveniles who are prosecuted in state criminal court are entitled
to due process rights, which include notice of charges, legal representation,
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-
incrimination). Similarly, in cases involving issues of voluntariness of a
juvenile's confession, the Court has applied Fourteenth Amendment protections.
See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (reversing the conviction based on
the professed confession by a fifteen-year-old Negro boy). The Court stated:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature
man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim
of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be
used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity.
Id.
44 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 72 (1985). The trial judge rejected the
defense counsel's argument that the Constitution requires assistance of an
indigent in preparation of his defense. Id. There was no testimony on either
side about Ake's sanity at the time of the offense because no one had examined
him at that point. Id. The jury was instructed to presume Ake was sane at the
time of the offense unless he presented sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable
doubt about his sanity at that time. Id.
45 Id. at 77 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)). The Court
considered three factors in determining whether the participation of a
psychiatrist is important enough that the State should be required to provide a
defendant with adequate psychiatrist assistance. Id. The first compelling factor
is the private interest which, in this case, is Ake's life or liberty. Id. The next
factor is the interest of the State in providing a psychiatrist, which is compelling
because both the defendant and the State have an interest in accurate
dispositions. Id. The last factor the court considered is the value of psychiatric
assistance, which is crucial to the defendant's ability to prepare his defense. Id.
FALL 2010] 11
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principles of fundamental fairness that govern the Ake criminal
defendant's meaningful defense also apply to the juvenile
defendant seeking to admit expert witness testimony based on
adolescent brain development.
The expert's testimony informs the trier of fact as to the
operation of the adolescent brain and its capacity to calibrate
appropriate behavior with judgment.46 A defendant must be
allowed to present his defense through introduction of hard and
soft science47 that contradicts and explains complicated evidence to
Because psychiatrists conduct professional examinations, gather facts, analyze
the information, and draw conclusions about a defendant's mental condition, the
Court determined that their expert assistance was meaningful in assisting the
trier of fact. Id. at 81. The psychiatrist could offer manageable evidence that
would help the trier of fact make an educated decision about the mental
condition of the defendant at the time of the offense. Id.
46 Cases following the Ake decision upheld appointment of experts in order to
ensure fundamental fairness where appointment of the experts was based on
"substantial need" and supported the position that due process principles should
govern decisions involving testimony of experts on adolescent brain maturity as
part of a juvenile defense. See Rey v. Texas, 897 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995) (holding that pathology, in general, and psychiatry are both
subspecialties of medicine that are not exact science like mathematics and
therefore, there is a need for a "second opinion"). If experts are allowed to
testify regarding areas of medicine where the science may not be completely
established or exact and a "second opinion" is indicated, then expert testimony
regarding the breadth of knowledge learned about the adolescent brain through
evolving neuroscience should also be considered as part of a meaningful
criminal defense. Id. See also State v. Johnson, 344 S.E.2d 775, 779 (N.C.
1986) (finding contrary to the cases that held indigent criminal defendants have
the right to an expert's assistance. Instead, no expert will be appointed if the
defendant fails to show "facts evidencing a specific or particularized need for a
medical expert."); Kinley v. Smith, 838 F.2d 1524, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1988)
(holding that defendant can only show that his due process rights were violated
if he can show that he made a timely request for expert assistance, which was
denied by the court, and that the denial led to an unfair trial); McBride v. State,
838 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that an indigent
defendant was entitled to appointment of an investigator/chemist and was
entitled to have appointed counsel reimbursed for expenses incurred for the
purpose of investigation and expert testimony).
Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie?: Re-Weighing Fingerprint
Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 15 (2003); see Emily
[VOL. 12: 112
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the jury.48 Notions of fundamental fairness must, therefore, prevail
in order to allow the adolescent's right to offer all relevant
information in his defense. If the Supreme Court is willing to
consider the aspects of a child's nature that make him, in fact, an
adolescent when applying constitutional protections, then the rules
of evidence should likewise incorporate the same considerations
for admitting adolescent brain imaging technology.
In two landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases, Kent v. U.S. and In
re Gault, the Court laid a foundation for interpreting the process by
which children in our legal system confront the consequences of
their behavior. It was then that the U.S. Supreme Court first
determined that juveniles are entitled to fundamental fairness in a
juvenile transfer proceeding.49 In addition, the most recent U.S
Supreme Court jurisprudence supports arguments in favor of
expanding the evidentiary rules to allow for expert witness
testimony offered on the issue of the adolescent's cognitive
capacity and judgment.o The Supreme Court in Roper addressed
arguments in favor of differing treatment being accorded to
Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science and Juvenile
Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 510 (2009) (arguing that culpability or
blameworthiness is not an assessment that can be made through examination of
developmental science, but should be determined based on the law).
48 See Ake, 470 U.S. at 83-84. In the analogous area of indigent defense, the
U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that a State must ensure that an
indigent criminal defendant has a "fair opportunity to present his defense." Id. at
76. Juvenile offenders also should be entitled to the full benefit of a criminal
defense. If a person's liberty is at stake, and that person cannot "participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding," then there is a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness. Id
See also Johnson, 344 S.E.2d at 775; McBride, 838 S.W.2d at 251; Rey, 897
S.W.2d at 338.
49 See Kent, 383 U.S. 541. The Court emphasized that while juvenile court
proceedings enjoy considerable latitude, the process for waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction must still comport with basic requirements of due process. Id. at
553.
5o See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (holding that the death
penalty may not be imposed on juveniles under the age of eighteen, reasoning
that the punishment is reserved for a narrow category of crimes and offenders).
FALL 2010] 13
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children under the age of eighteen who commit crimes." In
essence, the Court concluded that children function under a
diminished capacity that makes them less culpable than their adult
counterparts.5 2 The Roper decision effectively anoints
consideration of relevant adolescent brain imaging data on issues
concerning an adolescent's culpable capacity. One commentator
wrote, "[a]lthough one cannot assume that brain imaging had
anything to do with the result in this case, it is notable that brain
imaging was knocking on the door of the highest court in our
country.""
A closer reading of Roper in conjunction with prior U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence, 54 where juveniles are afforded due
process, further supports the argument that adolescent brain
imaging technology must be considered in the adjudication and
prosecution of juveniles, as required by the principles of fairness."
5 Id. In response to perceptions of increased juvenile crime and the abolition
of the death penalty for juveniles in the Roper decision, many states, like Texas,
have enacted criminal statutes that allow harsh irrevocable punishments for
children under the age of eighteen.
52 Id. at 594. In its 2005 opinion in Roper, the U.S. Supreme Court
reevaluated its constitutional interpretation made seventeen years earlier when
considering what society's evolving standard of decency coupled with the
justices' own independent judgment of what the Eighth Amendment to the Bill
of Rights intended.
1 Mark Pettit, Jr., fMR1 and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and The Federal
Rules ofEvidence, 33 AM J. L. & MED. 319, 335 (2007) (referring to Roper, 543
U.S at 551).
54 See generally Kent, 383 U.S. 541 (finding that a waiver hearing held under
state statute "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment"). Id. at 562. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (holding that
juveniles are entitled to principles of fundamental fairness and due process,
which includes a right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and
cross-examination, and to privilege against self-incrimination).
5 Bazelon, supra note 8, at 190. The author critiques three theoretical
justifications for rejecting the Infancy Defense in the Juvenile Courts, noting
that the defense safeguards due process rights of adolescents. Bazelon further
suggests that the standard of proof to overcome the presumption of incapacity is
insufficient and vague. Id. at 193. Accordingly, the author proposes a model
statute that would involve evaluations from mental health professionals and
educators. Id. at 194.
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Specifically, juvenile defendants must be able to offer brain
imaging data as scientific evidence to establish how their
diminished capacity reflects their inherent maturity and unreliable
decision-making processes that ultimately lead to criminal
activity.56
The Court's conclusions in Roper provide a relevant
framework from which we can extrapolate fairness principles and
their operation in determining the admissibility of scientific data
under the rules of evidence." The Court decided that execution of
offenders under the age of eighteen was constitutionally
impermissible because children differ significantly from adults in
their underdeveloped sense of responsibility, their impetuousness,
and most importantly, their inability to make well-considered
decisions."
The scientific data considered in Roper was not offered as
evidence or made part of the trial record.59 In fact, neither the
Roper court nor any of the lower courts in this matter heard
56 See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective
Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1765 (1995)
(explaining the developmental approach to the definition of maturity of
judgment and its legal implications).
5 Under Roper, juveniles function under a level of maturity and under
developed sense of responsibility that the Court found entitles them to be
forgiven for their misconduct. 543 U.S. at 570. Other commentators who have
studied neurobiological data and its impact on juvenile justice believe that the
Roper court's ruling buttresses consideration of other factors in the treatment of
juveniles under the law such as, "[c]ognitive function, psychiatric status, and
drug and alcohol use have all been linked to the ability to make decisions. . . ."
Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, The Mind of a Child: The
Relationship between Brain Development, Cognitive Functioning and
Accountability under the Law, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 322 (2006).
58 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
5 Justice Thomas cites in his dissent to scientific evidence included in
Amicus briefs submitted by several professional associations. The Justice
references the limitations on use of scientific methodology in the courts and
concludes that the legislatures should weigh conflicting views generated by the
psychological studies, because they can determine "a flexibility of approach that
is not available to the courts." Id. at 617-18 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 319 (1987)).
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evidence during the adversarial process regarding the scientific and
social studies upon which the ruling depends.60  Accordingly,
critics will argue that the scientific evidence referred to as the basis
for the Court's decision regarding juveniles as less mature and less
culpable was not credibly siphoned through the legal process.6 1
Nevertheless, the Court considered the data relevant when
interpreting an adolescent's constitutional protection from the
gravest punishment inflicted by the law-death.62 If an
adolescent's maturity is relevant to his constitutionally protected
rights under the Eighth Amendment, then adolescent brain imaging
technology should be offered under the states' evidentiary rules to
inform triers of fact on the impact that adolescence has on his
culpability. The Roper decision provides a pivotal turn toward
future jurisprudence that should encourage state courts to
acknowledge those characteristics inherent to adolescents, which
justify their differing treatment under the law.6 If the Supreme
60 See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
61 Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Roper, joined by Justice Thomas, stated, "the
Court looks to scientific and sociological studies.... [I]t never explains why
those particular studies are methodologically sound; none was ever entered into
evidence or tested in an adversarial proceeding." Id. at 617 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The dissenting Justices further comment on the existence of studies
that take contrary views from those endorsed by the majority regarding the
maturity levels of juveniles. Id. at 617-18.
62 Prior to Roper, the existing rule for seventeen years allowed execution of
juvenile offenders who were sixteen or seventeen years of age at the commission
of the crime. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 361 (1989). In Stanford,
the majority required a more "individualized consideration" under an Eighth
Amendment analysis. Id. The Court rejected arguments that other state laws
where children under the age of eighteen were barred from assuming
responsibility for drinking or driving, for example, were reflective of society's
views towards not executing children within this age group. Id. at 362.
63 In fact, the U. S. Supreme Court has recently considered different treatment
of children for purposes of applying search and seizure protections.
Specifically, the Court in Redding required school officials to possess
"reasonable suspicion" before conducting strip searches. Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2009). A standard emerges that
considers the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Id. at
2639. Ultimately, social and developmental differences of children permeate the
Court's decisions when setting forth different standards to be applied for not
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Court is willing to consider the aspects of a child's nature that
make him, in fact, an adolescent when applying constitutional
protections, then the rules of evidence should likewise incorporate
the same considerations for admitting adolescent brain imaging
technology.
While the states' evidentiary laws currently set forth the
standards under which most defendants present scientific evidence
for consideration by the trier of fact,64 those rules must be applied
by the trier of fact to fairly include brain imaging technology as a
basis for asserting "infancy" and deficient cognitive capacity when
adjudicating or prosecuting juveniles. U.S. Supreme Court
precedent guides the states in application of the evidentiary rules
through its thoughtful evolution about the way our legal system
should view children and, specifically, what kind of information is
relevant to the determinations made about their treatment under the
law." Consider the compelling language in the Stanford opinion
discounting the type of evidence relied on in Roper.66 Justice
Scalia stated:
[T]he views of interest groups, and the positions of professional
associations are too uncertain a foundation for constitutional law. Also
insufficient is socioscientific or ethicoscientific evidence tending to
show that capital punishment .. . fails to exact just retribution because
juveniles, being less mature and responsible, are less morally
blameworthy.
Seventeen years later, after being charged with analyzing the
objective indicia of consensus and determining its own
independent judgment, the Supreme Court has evolved to consider
"the scientific and sociological studies" cited by respondent and
his amici.6 Like the U.S. Supreme Court, individual states must
evolve in their application of the evidentiary rules by applying a
only Fourth Amendment protections, but also Fifth Amendment protections
against self-incrimination.
64 FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2000); ME. R. EvID. 701-706; TEX. R. EVID. 701-706.
65 See generally Roper; Stanford; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
66 See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
67 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 363.
68 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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modified Infancy Defense in which expert witness testimony on
adolescent brain imaging would be recognized through liberal
application of the evidentiary rule put forth in Daubert.69 If a
child's immaturity makes imposition of death constitutionally
impermissible, then notions of fundamental fairness should,
arguably, require application of evidentiary laws that allow for
admitting testimony that is relevant to the issue of cognitive
capacity and judgment.
The question becomes, to what extent the rules of evidence, as
applied to juvenile defendants, should reflect a "process" that is
fair, yet differs from the standards applied to their adult
counterparts. If decisions regarding a child's constitutional
protection under the Fourth," Fifth," Eighth,7 2 and Fourteenth"
Amendments are made by the U.S. Supreme Court based on
factors specifically pertaining to the child's adolescence, then the
Rules of Evidence must fairly afford him the opportunity to offer
expert witness testimony based on adolescent brain imaging
technology as justification for their differing treatment under the
law.
The courts must synthesize the body of jurisprudence
articulating principles of fundamental fairness in a meaningful
criminal defense with the jurisprudence that treats children
differently. The result is the proper interplay of fundamental
fairness concepts and the standards for admissibility of expert
witness testimony. The synthesized law then allows for a juvenile
offender's meaningful defense that is bolstered by adolescent brain
69 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1992)
("'General acceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of
scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of
Evidence-especially Rule 702-do assign to the trial judge the task of
ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand."); see also Lawson, supra note 46, at 56 (discussing
how the exclusion of fingerprinting evidence is contrary to the spirit of Daubert
and also curtails the due process rights of the defendant).
70 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644. (2009)
n Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 722 (1979).
72 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
7 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1966).
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technology. In order to fully appreciate arguments in favor of
admitting expert witness testimony of adolescent brain imaging,
we must first understand the technology as an integral part of the
argument.
III. ADOLESCENT BRAIN IMAGING-THE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS
CONCLUSIONS
A juvenile's meaningful defense specifically involves use of
adolescent brain imaging and expert witness testimony in a
modified Infancy Defense model. We must, therefore, examine
how the nature of neuroscience has advanced in order to appreciate
the way this evolving discipline impacts the evidentiary rules.
A. The Nature ofNeuroimaging
Scientists have historically studied brain function as it relates
to specific behavioral responses relevant to criminal activity.74 The
study of neuroimages comprises structural and functional images
of the brain." The computerized tomography ("CT scan") and the
magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") produce pictures of the soft
tissue structure of the brain.76 On the other hand, functional
neuroimages, such as positron emission tomography ("PET")77
74 One relevant area of study involves Evolutionary Neuroandrogenic Theory
("ENA"). Lee Ellis, A Theory Explaining Biological Correlates of Criminality,
2 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 287, 288 (2005). The ENA theory proposes that
aggressive behavior is an aspect of human evolution and that neurochemistry is
responsible for increased criminal behavior in males compared to females. Id. at
292. The theory maintains that brain functioning is affected by hormones and
can lead to criminal behavior. ENA theory associates biological factors with
criminal behavior and predicts that most offenders are males between thirteen
and thirty years old. Id. at 305. Hormones affect changes in the structure and
function of the brain and influence behavior. See also Jennifer Kulynych,
Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball? 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1255 (1996-1997).
7 Kulynych, supra note 74, at 1254 (stating that while the pictures look
similar to images of an individual's brain, they are more similar to charts or bar
graphs).
76 Id. at 1255.
7 PET scans are a relatively new diagnostic tool that neuroscientists use to
measure the glucose metabolic rates of different parts of the brain. DAN J.
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measure differences in metabolic rate and relative changes in the
physiological state of the brain." This technique is limited to
measuring cognitive activity indirectly."
The optimal studies of cognitive brain function would derive
from a hybrid image of functional and structural scans. The
functional MRI ("fMRI") involves measuring functional changes
in blood oxygenation (an index of metabolic activity) and
superimposing the changes upon a static structural MRI image of
the brain."o The fMRI provides a neuroimage that shows the
structure and the activity of the brain" by producing a tri-
dimensional view of internal biological processes.82 With the
fMRI, scientists make inferences regarding the relationship
TENNENHOUSE, ATTORNEYS MEDICAL DESKBOOK § 21:12 (4th ed. 2007). The
process involves the introduction of radioactive isotopes that are attached to a
tagged compound. Alan C. Hoffman, The Standard for Admissibility of
Evidence: Yesterday and Today, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 161, 162 (2009-2010).
Researchers analyze brain function by measuring how "area[s] of the brain
demonstrate the uptake of the isotope ... Id. Patients are injected with a
solution which is mixed with trace amounts of radioactivity. See Pettit, supra
note 53, at 320 n.4; United States v. Mezinsky, 206 F.Supp. 2d 661, 674 (E.D.
Pa. 2002). The scan takes axial slice images at six millimeter intervals and
reconstructs those images with the aid of a computer. Id. A computer also takes
the numerical data and converts them into pixels to make colors. Id. The data
from the individual patient's scan is then superimposed onto a brain imaging
template of a patient without abnormalities for comparison. Id. When a case
uses this technology to establish the defendant's diminished capacity, experts in
the area agreed that the PET scan is limited when used to establish a link
between the defendant's diminished capacity. Id. Experts in the area have also
agreed that the PET scan is limited when used to establish a link between the
defendant's brain and the legal element. Id. at 675. What the PET scan showed
was, "only a 'snapshot' of [the defendant's] brain." Id
78Kulynych, supra note 74, at 1256. The patient performs a cognitive task
during a PET scan and the scientists make inferences that correlate high
metabolic rates and underlying cognitive process. Id.; see also Jennifer
Kulynych, Brain, Mind, and Criminal Behavior: Neuroimages as Scientific
Evidence, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 235, 238 (1995-1996).
79Kulynych, supra note 74, at 1256.
so Id. at 1256.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1257.
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between changes in the brain and mental events." Specific
problems arise, however, that are endemic to the technology. The
fMRI facilitates inferences that can be drawn from changes
occurring in the brain. One problem involves the functional delay
in times between the nerve impulses and fluctuation in blood
oxygenation. These problems make the inferences drawn from the
technology weaker and arguably less valuable.84 Regardless,
functional brain imaging studies have been shown to be more
sensitive for the detection of abnormalities when compared with
MRI or CAT scans." Even the critics of the technology
acknowledge that the neurological research sheds light on an
individual's capacity when assessing the relevant issue of
blameworthiness.
Because neuroimages are digital representations of computer
generated numerical measurements, the brain scan that is
constructed may vary based on the technical parameters set by the
researcher.8 ' Even further, the individual scanners do not produce
identical imaging despite input of identical parameters.
Consequently, variations in mechanical, mathematical, and
computer software versions will influence the construction of a
neuroimage and the results recorded by different laboratories. 89
This means that if, hypothetically, a prosecutor and defense
attorney obtain separate images from two different hospitals they
might receive different results. While the variability in
83 Rogers & DuBois, supra note 33, at 18-19.
84 Kulynych, supra note 74, at 1256-57. See generally Rogers & DuBois,
supra note 33, at 18 (analyzing "the hurdles defense attorneys might have to
overcome to successfully put fMRI evidence into service for their clients").85STUART YUDOFSKY & ROBERT E. HALES., THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF NEUROPSYCHIATRY AND BEHAVIORAL
NEUROSCIENCES 604 (5th ed. 2008).
86 Peggy Sasso, Criminal Responsibility in the Age of "Mind-Reading," 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2009).
87 Kulynych, supra note 74, at 1254.
88 Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through A Scanner Darkly: Functional
Neuroimaging As Evidence of A Criminal Defendant's Past Mental States, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1144 (2009-2010).
89 Kulynych, supra note 74, at 1254-55.
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neuroimaging might present evidentiary challenges, efforts to
minimize these issues are being addressed through the National
Institutes of Health ("NIH") that spearheaded a collective study by
researchers called The Biomedical Information Network
("BIRN").90 The future utility of neuroimaging in the courtroom
is, therefore, being refined to address evidentiary concerns.
B. The Technology Informs Us: Prefrontal Cortex9 1 and Frontal
Lobe92 Development-The Adolescent's Journey from Emotion
to Cognition
Initially, scientists examined the adolescent brain to discover
the causes for autism and hyperactivity disorder.93 More recently,
longitudinal studies indicate that the frontal lobes are the last parts
of the brain to reach maturity.94 These studies provide an
important basis for comparison to studies performed by a Harvard
neuropsychologist showing that adults use their frontal lobes for
90 Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior:
Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33
AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 281 (2007). The outcome of the BIRN project promises
standardization of the procedures assisting in future application of the
technology in the area of lie detection. Id. at 290.
91 The prefrontal cortex is located in the front of the brain that is divided into
three areas: the dorsolateral, orbitofrontal and mesial. Gruber & Yurgelun-
Todd, supra note 57, at 322. It is the region of the brain involved in "planning
complex cognitive behaviors, personality expression and moderating correct
social behavior." Id. Additionally, the prefrontal cortex plays a key role "in the
development and execution of novel thoughts and behaviors." Id. Researchers
have identified continued development in the prefrontal cortex from the first
year of an infant's life, through post-adolescence, and into thirty years of age.
Id. at 324.
92 Frontal lobe development during adolescence involves notable changes in
the composition of this area of the brain where cognitive functioning occurs.
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., The Relevance of Brain Research to Juvenile Defense,
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2005, at 51. One important change is referred to as
"pruning" or thinning of gray matter, which strengthens the connections
between the neurons. Id. at 52.
9 Id. at 51.
94 id.
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planning and judgment, while teenagers rely on their amygdala,9 5
which is associated with emotional reactions,9 6 to make decisions.
Adolescent vulnerability stems from their inability to perceive the
risks associated with their action to the same degree as their adult
counterparts." When analyzing issues of wrongful conduct, the
trier of fact can be reliably informed by adolescent brain
development.
For instance, adolescents are less able to make the moral
judgments that directly influence the decision to commit a crime
because certain regions of the brain, specifically the dorsolateral
and ventromedial regions of the prefrontal cortex, have not yet
fully developed until later in adolescence." Studies have shown
that certain regions in the prefrontal cortex of the brain are critical
in the formation and application of socio-moral reasoning.99
Specifically, deficits in the orbitofrontal cortex have been shown to
95 This area of the brain is considered the most primitive area because it is
responsible for processing our perceived fears and threatening circumstances.
The amygdala also develops our responsive behaviors like gut-reactions,
aggression, and impulsivity. Johndro, supra note 17, at 359-60. Unlike adults,
adolescents process information through the amygdala primarily rather than
through the frontal lobes where more complex planning occurs. Id
96 Shepherd, supra note 92, at 52.9 7Ann E. Kelley, et al., Risk Taking and Novelty Seeking in Adolescence,
1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sd. 27, 27-32 (2004) (discussing specific alterations
in brain development that accompany neuroendocrine changes). See also
Rightmer, supra note 21, at 27-28 (advocating for consideration of all relevant
information, including MRI technology, in making laws that would retain
adolescents in the juvenile system until their brains fully mature).
98 Clarke, supra note 39, at 709-10 (examining developmental realities about
adolescent development and the punitive policies that have evolved over recent
years).
99Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristen Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to
Normative Judgment in Law and Justice, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
Soc'y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1709, 1718 (2004) (examining lesion studies
conducted by researchers using data taken from patients with damage to the
brain resulting from orbitofrontal injury of the brain, disease, and developmental
problems. These studies determine corresponding deficits in making moral
decisions and implementing appropriate behavior.).
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cause problems in learning moral information and in "cuing
morally appropriate behaviour."'00
The changes in adolescent frontal brain lobes affect the
adolescent's emotions and their ability to control their thoughts
and behavior."0 ' The prefrontal lobes have long been considered
crucial to a variety of human thoughts and behaviors, including
social behavior, self-evaluation, and prioritizing values.' 2 As a
result, adolescents have the tendency to engage in risky behavior
because they do not anticipate the negative outcomes.'03 When we
see adolescents behaving impulsively and with frequent mood
swings, this indicates immature prefrontal lobe development.'0 4
The same region of the brain has been shown to be involved in
experiencing regret and anticipating consequences.o' Individuals
engage in higher mental abilities that rely on things like
"understanding of a situation, appraising its emotional valence,
activating norms from long-term memory, maintaining a norm in
working memory, comparing the norm with the present behavior,
and deciding if there is any transgression, all of which take place
under the influence of emotional processes.""o In addition, an
adolescent's limbic system, though not fully developed, processes
the emotion rather than their frontal lobe, which is the processing
center for the brain when fully developed.'
While logical reasoning abilities reach adult levels by age
fifteen, psychosocial capacities continue to develop into young
'oo Id.
101 Kelly D. Schwartz, Adolescent Brain Development: An Oxymoron No
Longer, J. YOUTH MINISTRY, Spring 2008, at 85, 88 (2008) (explaining studies
conducted regarding the effect of prefrontal lobe changes in adolescents).
102Id.
1 Id. at 89.
'0Id. at 90.
1o5 Id. at 89. See also Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 99.
106 See also Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 99, at 1717.
107 NAT'L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, USING ADOLESCENT BRAIN
RESEARCH TO INFORM POLICY: A GUIDE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCATES 1
(2008).
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adulthood.'" The increased risk taking during adolescence is the
result of competition between socio-emotional and cognitive
control networks.'09 The socio-emotional network is remodeled by
hormonal changes during puberty and is located in the limbic and
paralimbic areas of the brain."0 The cognitive-control network
consists of outer regions of the brain."' When the socio-emotional
network is not activated, the cognitive-control network imposes
control over risky behavior."12 Under emotional arousal, the socio-
emotional network is activated and leads toward risk taking."' The
prefrontal cortex is responsible for higher order functions, which
are all interrelated with our decisions to forego immediate rewards
versus delayed ones.14  Studies have shown that
neuropsychological deficits in children have a significant effect on
levels of self-control and that low self-control is the result of
biological and social factors."'
Furthermore, the significant increase in both the growth of the
wiring between neurons and in the number of neurons is another
factor affecting behavior (a newborn possess only slightly smaller
108 Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives from







" Id. at 57.
" See Joseph H. Baskin et. al., Is A Picture Worth A Thousand Words?
Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239, 251 (2007)
(presenting a case that establishes how adequate neuroimaging can contribute to
resolution of criminal manslaughter charges.) In the case, repeat
neuropsychological testing showed widespread cognitive deficits in her frontal
systems impacting memory and information processing as well as poor self-
control. Id. at 252; see also Marie Ratchford & Kevin M. Beaver,
Neuropsychological Deficits, Low Self-Control, and Delinquent Involvement
Toward a Biosocial Explanation of Delinquency, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 147,
149 (2009) (analyzing the correlation between self-control and biology on
adolescent delinquent behavior).
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amounts than in adulthood)."'6  In fact, Dr. Jay Giedd of the
National Institute of Mental Health concluded that brain
maturation continues into the twenties." Recently, studies have
revealed that the brain matures far beyond the end of adolescence
through developmental processes of synaptic pruning and
myelination,"' and gray matter increases during pre-adolescence
and decreases during post-adolescence." 9
Synaptic pruning refers to the brain's growth process. 20 Here,
an individual's brain increases in synaptic production with
reduction occurring after puberty.2 ' This reduction of synapses,
called pruning, improves higher cognitive functions like abstract
"
6 Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Supama Choudhury, Development of the
Adolescent Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition,
47 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 296, 297 (2006) (outlining how the brain
changes between childhood and adulthood).
1" ACT FOR YOUTH UPSTATE CTR. FOR EXCELLENCE, RESEARCH FACTS &
FINDINGS: ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 1 (2002).
118 In recent years, neuroscientists have named two key developmental
processes: myelination and pruning of neural connections. Aronson, Brain
Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, supra note 34, at 120.
Myelination provides the insulation necessary to efficiently transmit electrical
signals from one neuron to the next. Id. Pruning takes place during adolescence
and well into adulthood. Id. In either case, regions of the brain responsible for
basic life processes mature fastest, whereas the regions responsible for behavior
inhibition, control, and decision making take longer. Id. The results of both of
these processes can be seen with modem MRI technology. Id.; see also
Maroney, supra note 33, at 98-99 (asserting that adolescent brain science shows
how structural processes referred to as myelination and synaptical development
occurs); Seymour Moskowitz, Save the Children: The Legal Abandonment of
American Youth in the Workplace, 43 AKRON L. REV. 107, 150 (2010)
(supporting the premise that neural maturation continues into our mid-twenties);
Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 116, at 300; Schwartz, supra note 101, at
86 (reviewing the research of developmental psychology with commentary on
how it effects the community, parents, and adolescents).
119 Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MR1 Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 862
(1999).
120 Emily Edwards, But I'm Just a Kid: Juvenile Adjudications and
Sentencing Enhancements, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 224 (2009).
121 id.
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thinking, language, and hypothetical thinking.122  The synaptic
pruning in the adolescent brain leads to reduced use of the
decision-making areas of the brain when making choices involving
risk.123 Therefore, adolescents can overstate rewards and not fully
evaluate the risks or consequences of their acts. They may seek
excitement through extremely risky behavior because the
redistribution of dopamine raises their threshold for attaining
pleasure.124
An adolescent's poor decision-making, recklessness, and
emotional outbursts might be due to immature areas of the brain
that are responsible for self-control, judgment, and emotions.125
Dr. Sarah-Jayne Blakemore from the Institute of Cognitive
Neuroscience at the University College London, has concluded
that adolescents use their prefrontal cortex to a greater extent than
adults to achieve the same results during intentional causality. 26
This means that there is a higher demand on an adolescent's brain
compared to that of an adult during mentalising. Also known as
"[t]heory of mind ... mentalising . . . refers to the inferences that
we naturally make about other people's intentions, beliefs and
desires, which we then use to predict their behaviour." 27
Given what scientists have learned about the adolescent's brain
function, the courts must now interpret evidentiary rules in a fair
manner as commanded by principles of fundamental fairness. A
study of the evidentiary rules pertaining to expert witness
testimony supports arguments for evolution of evidentiary rule
standards in a similar manner to the evolution that has already
occurred in the study of adolescent brain neuroscience.
122 Schwartz, supra note 101, at 87.
123 Edwards, supra note 120, at 224.
124Maroney, supra note 33, at 110. Dopamine is a chemical produced by the
brain that links action to sensation of pleasure.
125 Id.
126 Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, The Social Brain of a Teenager, 20
PSYCHOLOGIST 600, 602 (2007).
127Id. at 601.
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IV. EVIDENTIARY RULE JURISPRUDENCE
Just as the development of adolescent brain technology informs
the scientific world, the evidentiary rules must, likewise, develop
by allowing for admissibility of new scientific data. Under the
evidentiary standards set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court, trial
court judges are anointed with discretion to incorporate adolescent
brain imaging technology into the courtroom when offered as part
of juvenile offenders' meaningful Infancy Defense.
Like any testimony offered by the parties in an adversarial
process, expert witness testimony based on scientific data-in this
case adolescent brain imaging technology-is subject to the
evidentiary rules governing admissibility.'28 The rules of evidence
set forth standards that are designed to aid the trial court judge in
determining relevant and reliable information offered by the
parties.'29 Principles of fairness are inherent to the rules governing
the evidentiary process,' especially since all defendants have a
constitutional right to put forth their best defense. In the
adversarial process, this involves offering relevant and reliable
information, which may sometimes include cutting edge scientific
studies and research. As one commentator explains, "[d]ue
process requires that a defendant be allowed to present his defense,
and intertwined within the right to defend oneself is the ability to
properly explain, as well as contradict, complicated evidence to the
jury."'3
The expert testimony affords juvenile defendants the fullest
opportunity to present information in support of the states' Infancy
Defense laws 32 that not only explains but also contradicts their
legal culpability as a function of their deficiencies. The law must
necessarily accommodate interdisciplinary progression in the areas
of neuroscience that serves to inform us as society constantly
128 Pettit, supra note 53, at 324.
129 Lawson, supra note 47, at 14.
O Id. at 15.
131 Id. at 14.
132 See discussion infra Part V.
28 [VOL. 12: 1
Brain Imaging in Prosecution
develops normative standards under which individuals are
criminally responsible.
A. Frye and Daubert: The Evolution ofEvidentiary Norms
The U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.133 reviewed the long-standing "general
acceptance"'34 evidentiary standard for admitting expert witness
testimony after a period of division among the circuits.' Under
the "general acceptance" Frye standard, an expert's opinion based
on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless it is generally
1 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
(holding that the "general acceptance" test was superseded by the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence and provided specific guidance for admitting
expert testimony). The Daubert Court regards enactment of the Federal Rules
of Evidence (FRE), Pub. L. No. 93-595 (1975), as an annulment of the prior
"general acceptance" standard and based its decision on their interpretation of
the legislation. Id In Daubert, the parents of two boys sued Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals to recover damages for birth defects that they asserted were
caused when the mother ingested the prescription antinausea drug, Benedectin.
Id. Both plaintiff and defendant offered experts who testified to whether
Benedictin was a cause of the birth defects. A battle of the experts ensued
ending in the District Court's excluding expert opinion testimony that was not
based on the large volume of epidemiological data addressing Benedictin and its
side effects. Since the epidemiological analysis was not based on published
works, nor was it subjected to peer review, the District Court excluded the
evidence as inadmissible reasoning that there was no causal like between
Benedictin and the birth defects. Id. at 584. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision stating that expert opinion testimony cannot
be "generally accepted" if the methodology testified to "diverges significantly
from procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field." Id.
134 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For seventy years, the
general acceptance test articulated in Frye was the prevailing standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit determined that a polygraph test was
inadmissible because it was not sufficiently accepted among experts in the field.
Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, The Need for An
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857, 877 (1992).
135 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
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accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community.'3 ' After
contemplating congressional drafting history, which failed to
mention the common law Frye standard, the Court found "a rigid
'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the
'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of
relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony."""
Specifically, the Court in Daubert found that the governing
Federal Rule 702, while placing limits on the admissibility of
scientific evidence, still allows for the administrator of the
proceedings-the trial court judge-to ultimately determine
relevance and reliability.' Once the trial court judge is named as
the final arbiter, the Court directs his role in the necessary
regulation of theories and methodologies that impact the decision
making process by providing several factors for him to consider in
the evidentiary rule application process."'
This process should result in the admissibility of expert witness
testimony about the adolescent brain. It is relevant, first and
foremost, because the testimony assists the trier of fact'40 by
providing scientific data on matters vital to exculpating the
136 id
137 Id. at 588 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
1311d. at 589.
139 Id. at 592. The trial judge must assess (1) whether the expert is proposing
to testify to scientific knowledge and (2) whether that scientific knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Id. Also,
scientific knowledge assists the trier of fact when it is based on (1) methods and
principles that can and have been tested, (2) theories or techniques that have
been subject to peer review with due consideration to be given to, and (3) the
technique's known or potential rate of error. Id. The Court notes that
publication of the theory or technique is only one element of review. Id. at 593.
The main point here is that the knowledge to which the expert testifies has been
appropriately scrutinized by the scientific community. Id. This article asserts
that brain imaging technology affords us certain knowledge about the regions of
the brain and their function that scientists generally agree. The expert witness
testimony of what the technology reveals about the adolescent brain
development passes the Daubert test. In light of the current technological
limitations, however, this article advocates for use of the testimony only to the
extent of its tested and proven parameters.
1o ld. at 591.
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juvenile offender under the Infancy Defense. If the defense
requires a determination that an adolescent understands the
difference between right and wrong behavior,14' scientific data that
inform the jury about the adolescent brain decision-making process
helps the judge or jury determine whether the law should impose
the same level of responsibility on a juvenile as it does on his adult
counterpart.'4 2 If the trier of fact considers the scientific data on
the immature prefrontal lobe development,'43 he can meaningfully
assess an appropriate legal sanction or exculpation.
The scientific data speaks directly to one of perhaps several
facts at issue in determining whether a juvenile defendant
understood the wrongdoing. The trial court judge can fairly
determine that it meets the relevancy standard under Daubert and
then assess whether the prosecution or the defense has refuted or
sufficiently established exculpation.'" The scientific data showing
adolescent brain deficiency may seemingly result in validation of
an Infancy Defense assertion every time it is offered.
Nevertheless, the adversarial process presents an opportunity for
the opposing side or prosecution to refute the trier of fact's
understanding of the adolescent brain capacity. In fact, the
Daubert Court states, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof
are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence." 45
In other words, the Court contemplates situations where the
trial judge preliminarily determines that the questioned evidence is
admissible. If the scientific evidence is relevant, the trial court
141 Bazelon, supra note 8, at 169.
1421d. at 187.
143 Schwartz, supra note 101, at 87-88.
'" Conversely, it may appear that the scientific data showing adolescent brain
deficiency would practically result in validation of an Infancy Defense assertion
every time they are offered. This argument is shortsighted, however, in light of
the opportunity under a modified Infancy Defense model for the opposing side
or prosecution to refute the trier of fact's understanding of the adolescent brain
capacity.
145 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
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judge need not be constrained by concern over the foundationally
sound scientific evidence because the "process" will ferret out and
address those concerns. Consequently, the trial court judge's
decisions as the final arbiter in determining admissible issues
where neuroscience and the law converge operate within the
safeguard of the adversarial system. He must consider the
soundness of scientific evidence and its reliability,'46 allowing for
this evolving area of science.'4 7 We must view the trial court
judge's application of relevancy standards from the liberal
perspective articulated by Daubert"'8 and supported by the
differing treatment of children as embraced by prior U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence in Roper.
We charge the highest Court in the land with stewardship over
proper application of the Constitution as a living document that is
relevant to the times in which it governs. Science is life and
evolves just like society's views. The Court's decisions determine
just how tolerant the legal process will be in its application of
progressive scientific evidence. Therefore, states must follow a
tolerant path toward application of evidentiary standards that assist
the triers of fact as to the evolving developmental brain of
14 6 Id. at 589.
147 See generally Shepherd, supra note 92, at 51 (where the author discusses
the evolution of scientific brain research since the 1990s and its implications in
the criminal justice system).
148 The U.S. Supreme Court's liberal review of the admissibility standards
bears importance because, just as in its review of the Eighth Amendment in
Roper, the review of the Frye standard occurs after the passage of several years.
Even though the Court considers congressional statutory enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Daubert rather than application of Eighth
Amendment constitutional protections as in Roper, we observe the Daubert
court making decisions in a timely context. In Roper, the Court interprets
society's views of "evolving standards of decency[.]" See generally Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In Daubert, the court is interpreting factors for
admitting "novel" scientific evidence. See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
Not so surprisingly, the final outcome in both landmark cases represents
expansion of the Supreme Court's prior positions. We must view the Daubert
charge to the trial court judge as one made in the evolving spirit of U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence reflecting treatment of children differently under
the law.
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juveniles. The Court's decision in Daubert and case law decided
thereafter provides a sufficient foundation for the trial court judge
to act as gatekeeper and apply evidentiary standards for
determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony based on
adolescent brain imaging science.
B. A Causal Connection Between Expert Testimony and the
Juvenile's Cognitive Capacity
Following the Daubert decision, the federal courts continued to
sculpt the legal framework of evidentiary rule analysis. In
"Daubert II"'4 9 the Ninth Circuit further opined on the "post-
Daubert" world. The court described the trial court judge's task of
determining the "soundness" of scientific "methodology" of an
expert as "daunting," but guided by illustrative factors as part of a
two-prong analysis.' Under the facts in Daubert II, the court
decided that the experts had to testify to the pertinent inquiry of
causation between the drug, Bendictin, and the minor children's
limb reduction defects."' This subsequent interpretation of the
149 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (1995)
(holding, on remand, that the expert testimony was not admissible because the
three groups of experts were testifying to conclusions that do not reflect
consensus within the scientific community).
1o Id. at 1315-16, 1318. First, the trial judge must determine "whether the
experts' testimony reflects 'scientific knowledge,"' is "derived by the scientific
method," and results from work that is "good science." Id. at 1315. Second, the
trial judge must perform a " 'fit' requirement" showing that the expert testimony
logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party's case. Id. at 1315.
"One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing
to testify about matters" that result from research "conducted independent of the
litigation. . . ." Id. at 1317. The trial judge should regard this fact as objective
proof that the expert will testify to research based on good science. Id at 1320.
Even further, the Ninth Circuit describes the second requirement as determining
whether the testimony "fit" an issue in the case, or otherwise met the
"helpfulness" standard in Rule 702. Id. at 1320. This means that there must be
"a valid scientific connection to a pertinent inquiry" before the testimony can be
admitted. Id. (quoting 509 U.S. 579, 591).
1' Id. Two minors sued Merrell Dow for products liability when they
suffered limb reduction birth defects. The minors alleged that their mothers'




Supreme Court's analysis in Daubert raised the more specific issue
of sufficient connection between the expert's testimony and the
facts presented in the case. The substantive tort law in California
provided the basis for the Daubert II court's causation
determination.S 2
While the court acknowledged that modern tort law does not
always require direct causation, ultimately, it placed a burden on
the plaintiff to show more likely than not that their injuries were
caused by the defendant's drug.'53 Based on the "post-Daubert
world" directive, the trial court judge must still find a causal
connection between the expert's testimony, based on adolescent
brain imaging showing diminished cognitive capacity of
adolescents, and the specific cognitive capacity of the individual
juvenile defendant.'54 Nevertheless, this article suggests that the
152 Id. at 1320. Plaintiffs offered circumstantial rather than direct proof of
causation and were unsuccessful in satisfying the burden imposed by the court.
1 Id.
154 See U.S. v. Williams, No. CR 06-00079 DAE-KSC, 2009 WL 424583, at
* 1l (D. Haw. Feb. 20, 2009). When assessing the second prong for determining
whether the testimony on the condition of "borderline intellectual functioning"
("BIF") and the issue in the case, the court stated the following:
Dr. Young's testimony that BIF and brain damage could have the
potential to impact Defendant's ability to form mens rea is a tenuous
causal connection. Had Dr. Young stated that BIF "often" or "likely"
had an impact on Defendant's cognitive abilities, the connection would
be more obvious. In reality, any number of things can have the
potential to impact the abilities of a person of even average
intelligence.
However, in light of the fact that Dr. Young's testimony can inform
the jury of situations in which people with BIF and brain damage are
particularly vulnerable to cognitive disability, this Court finds
Defendant has shown a minimal causal connection to the inquiry of
capacity to form specific intent. This Court understands Dr. Young's
testimony to mean that Defendant has particular strengths and
weaknesses which may be exacerbated in certain situations. As such,
her diagnosis is not implying that it was equally likely that Defendant
had the capacity on the day of T.E.W.'s death as any other day. Rather,
the jury will be able to take Dr. Young's description of Defendant's
weaknesses and disabilities and consider those in light of the factual
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application of the evidentiary rules must allow the trial court judge
to assess the proffered neuroscience in light of its ability to inform
the trier of fact of relevant considerations as to inherent
characteristics of that adolescent offender."'
The adolescent brain's cognitive process speaks directly to the
issue of "knowing" the wrongfulness of one's actions."' The
juvenile defendant is asserting that these scientific data are
material to this determination under the states' Infancy Defense
law.' It is difficult not to accept scientifically proven data
explaining a juvenile defendant's brain development if the inquiry
is whether the law should allow exculpation based on "infancy" or
differences between adolescence and adulthood. When the
testimony is offered in the context of an Infancy Defense, the trial
judge as "gatekeeper" can consider the scientific data as
probative' in establishing the helpfulness of this exculpatory tool
without requiring a direct causal connection."'
Some states' case law follows a liberal approach for
establishing the relevancy of expert testimony,6 o while others
apply the general acceptance standard.'"' In Marsh v. Valvyou, The
evidence put forth about the particular circumstances surrounding the
alleged abuse.
Id at *11-12.
' Id. at *12.
156 Buss, supra note 47 at 495.
11 See Shepherd, supra note 92, at 52 (concluding that it is helpful for
lawyers to understand neurology and to communicate it when defending
juveniles).
158 See Williams, 2009 WL 424583 at *3.
159 See Smith v City of Gulfport, 949 So. 2d 844, 850 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)
(determining that the trial court did not err in assessing the "degree of scientific
certainty" from which the expert testified and that such expert testimony was
required to prove causation); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43
F.3d 1311, 1320 (1995).
"60 See Williams, 2009 WL 424583 at * 1.
161 See Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 180 (Mo. 2009) (holding that the
results of a PET scan were inadmissible to show defendant's personality
disorder. The witness' testimony was not generally accepted scientific evidence
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Supreme Court of Florida applied the causal link issue more
liberally by admitting expert testimony as to whether several car
accident traumas could cause fibromyalgia.162 In Marsh, the court
held that the expert testimony making causation arguments about
fibromyalgia as a pain syndrome "is not 'new or novel."'l 63 And,
the "differential diagnosis technique" used to counter the expert's
testimony meets the general acceptance standard.'" The evidence
was ultimately admitted despite an absence of epidemiological
studies or the need for more research showing a causal link
between the two.165 What's notable about the Marsh decision is the
important distinction between brain imaging technology used to
draw conclusions about the adolescent brain and well known
scientific debates over correlation to conditions like fibromyalgia.
This distinction forms the basis for the court's analysis that expert
opinion testimony (and its conclusions) based on generally
accepted methods and principles must be given proper weight by
the trier of fact, but not expressly excluded.'6 6 Marsh follows its
own precedent from five years earlier stating, "once the Frye test is
satisfied through proof of general acceptance of the basis of the
opinion, the expert's opinions are to be evaluated by the finder of
because it did not show how the PET scan can be linked to diagnosed
personality disorders; therefore, it has limited mitigating value).
162 Marsh v. Valvyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 550 (Fla. 2007). The defendant in the
negligence action filed by the plaintiff argued that the expert testimony should
not be admissible since the connection between trauma and fibromyalgia was
not a generally accepted assertion in the scientific community. Id. at 545. The
court admitted the testimony even without any studies demonstrating the causal
link. Id. at 550.
"' Id. at 548.
'64Id. at 549. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately concludes that the trier
of fact can properly resolve causation issues resulting from contrary scientific
theories. Id.
165 Id. The court cites to Florida's Ist District Court of Appeals, decided after
Daubert, that stated, "[w]hile ... there continues to be scientific debate .. .we
find the epidemiological science and methodology underlying [the expert's]
testimony to be established, reliable and well-founded." Id. (citing Berry v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
16Id. at 564.
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fact and are properly assessed as a matter of weight, not
admissibility."1 6 7
In the end, Judge Ezra in the Williams case embraces such
adversarial mechanisms by stating, "[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence."' 8 This has to be the
proper approach when facing the evolving nature of expert witness
testimony based on scientific methods. Once the adolescent brain
imaging technology is established as "generally accepted" (in those
states following Frye) or reliable (in those states applying
Daubert), the expert's statements regarding the deficiencies in
brain function as it pertains to the issue of wrongfulness can be
properly weighed by the judge or jury, but not unfairly excluded as
inadmissible. The legal structure imposes evidentiary boundaries
like those in Daubert to protect against the higher risk of confusion
and misunderstanding of scientific evidence. This article suggests,
however, that the evidentiary boundaries can be sustained and still
accommodate developing, probative information about the
adolescent brain when imposing normative legal standards based
on one's knowledge of wrongfulness.
C. The "Gatekeeper" Reigns
The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert set the foundation
for the trial court judge's role as gatekeeper.' 9 It is in this capacity
that he can apply the evidentiary rules so as to admit brain imaging
technology. In subsequent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated the states' latitude in promulgating constitutionally
permissible rules that exclude evidence as "long as they are not
'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
i67Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
168 United States v. Williams, No. CR 06-00079 DAE-KSC, 2009 WL
424583, at * 15 (D. Haw. Feb. 20, 2009) (citing to Daubert 1, 509 U.S. at 596).
169 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598 (1993). After
positioning the trial judge as gatekeeper over the application of evidentiary
standards, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court's
judgment for further proceedings. Id.
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serve.""" The evidentiary rules must still reflect fundamental
Sixth Amendment rights allowing criminal defendants to present a
meaningful defense."' This is consistent with the Court's
reasoning in Daubert that points to fundamental fairness principles
in the adversarial process.172
While Daubert II continued the reign of a more liberal
approach to the use of expert witness testimony,"' the Supreme
Court Justices later granted considerable discretion to the trial
court judge's gatekeeping capacity regarding admissibility of, not
only, scientific evidence, but also technical or other specialized
knowledge. 1' The Court reiterated the intent of the gatekeeping
requirement as insuring the relevance and reliability of expert
testimony."' With this discretion, subsequent courts directly
turned to the Federal Rules of Evidence for guidance in
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.'76
Under the states' evidentiary rules, trial court judges practically
apply the mandates of their own jurisdictional equivalent of
70 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)).
1' See generally Chambers v. Miss., 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (holding that the
exclusion of evidence and inability to cross-examine impeded the defendant's
fundamental right to due process).
172 Id.
'73 Pettit, supra note 53, at 326.
174 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 311 (per se rule excluding polygraph evidence is
constitutional; however, the trial court's exercise of discretion provides tension
between the prior Daubert opinion and Scheffer); See General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (mandating that evidentiary rulings made at
trial be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard that examines the trial
court's acceptance, or rejection, of both the methodology and conclusions of the
expert). The court notes that, "conclusions and methodology are not entirely
distinct from one another." Id; see also Kumho Tire Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (ruling that the trial judge's decision should be reviewed
based on an abuse of discretion standard that gives him "considerable leeway in
deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular
expert testimony is reliable"). Id. at 155.
1'
7 See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 311.
176 See United States v. Williams, No. CR 06-00079 DAE-KSC, 2009 WL
424583, at *2-4 (D. Haw. Feb. 20, 2009); See also Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
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Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 702' and FRE 403."7
Daubert summarily provides that scientific testimony must assist
the trier of factl79 without prejudicing or confusing the jury.'so
Therefore, we see a compounded analysis in that while the
scientific evidence may be based on "reliable" principles and
methods, it has become essential to also determine that the expert
witness testimony offers a probative value that is not substantially
outweighed by potential prejudice and confusion.'
177 FRE 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training
or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702. The general standard for admissibility of scientific evidence
reflected in FRE 702 requires relevancy and reliability; however, the expert who
testifies as to the scientific data must also satisfy the additional points (1)
through (3) stated above. These points make clear the prevailing role of the trial
court judge in ultimately assessing the proffered evidence and its impact on any
case.
78 FRE 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R.
EvID. 403.
179 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
"o Id. at 595.
18 ' The Daubert Court specifically provides guidance to the trial court judge
in determining the admissibility of evidence, stating:
Additionally, in the event the trial court concludes that the scintilla of
evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a
reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is
true, the court remains free to direct a judgment, . . . and likewise to
grant summary judgment.. . . These conventional devices, rather than
wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance'
test, are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific
testimony meets the standards of Rule 702.
Id at 596. Here, the Court points to other mechanisms within the adversarial
process that the trial court judge can utilize so as to ensure a proper result. The
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With the power granted under Daubert, the trial court judge
assumes the role of gatekeeper by not only determining relevancy
issues, but also wielding a sword in the form of an exclusionary
rule-FRE 403. The expert testimony based on adolescent brain
imaging overcomes relevancy obstacles because it presents
valuable testimony as part of a meaningful Infancy Defense. The
trial court judge fulfills his role as gatekeeper by appreciating the
probative value of the testimony lest it be stricken by the
"exclusionary sword."' 82
D. Relevancy, Reliability, and The Exclusionary Sword
Cases addressing expert witness testimony specifically based
on brain imaging technology rather than opinion testimony of
psychological defect are scarce. Courts admit evidence based on
other brain abnormalities under the states' evidentiary rules.' In
these instances, however, the courts are applying FRE 702 and 403
to non-scientific evidence based on expert's opinion testimony.'84
The Sandoval-Mendoza case most importantly portrays the
nature of scientific evidence and witness testimony in a light that
embraces difficult decisions generated by the technology used in
adolescent brain imaging. The Ninth Circuit states the following:
The district court concluded that the proposed medical expert opinion
testimony was unreliable because it did not conclusively prove
mechanisms are preferable to a broad scale exclusion of otherwise valuable
evidence. Since the Court places confidence in the ability of the trial court judge
to assess and weigh evidentiary concerns even more than in cases involving lay
witnesses, the state courts should follow its direction and sentiment when
interpreting and applying its evidentiary rules regarding the admissibility of
adolescent brain science.
82 Id. at 595.
183 See generally United States v. Williams, No. CR 06-00079 DAE-KSC,
2009 WL 424583, at *2-4 (D. Haw. Feb. 20, 2009).
184 See United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza , 472 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 2006)
(reinforcing the "gatekeepers" role by holding that medical expert testimony
based on MRI scans and other performance IQ testing was admissible. The
Ninth Circuit admitted the expert witness testimony reasoning that Daubert
instructs the district court judge as a "gatekeepers, not a fact finder." Id. at 654.
Juries, instead of judges, can weigh differing, credible, and qualified expert
testimony. Id.
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Sandoval-Mendoza's brain tumor caused susceptibility to inducement
or a lack of predisposition. But medical knowledge is often uncertain.
The human body is complex, etiology is often uncertain .... This does
not preclude the introduction of medical expert opinion testimony when
medical knowledge "permits the assertion of a reasonable opinion."
Adolescent brain imaging technology, like the MRI in Sandoval-
Mendoza, presents medical knowledge on which experts will have
differing opinions. Regardless, the testimony is relevant and does
not confuse the issue of juvenile offenders' cognition under the
Infancy Defense. The technology that images the adolescent brain
cannot currently show direct correlation between an individual's
brain function and the specific brain images presented in court.'"'
However, experts can properly testify as to the conclusions that
can be drawn from the images pertaining to most adolescent brain
structures. After determining their credibility, the jury (trier of
fact) can then appropriately weigh the testimony offered in support
of the juvenile offender's meaningful defense.'"I
Three years after the Sandoval-Mendoza case, the United
States District Court of Hawaii'" provided an even more in-depth
and timely illustration of what should be the proper analysis to be
performed by the trial court judge when confronted with novel
scientific methodology in the adjudication and prosecution of
today's juvenile offenders.' Though the U.S. v. Williams case
does not involve a juvenile defendant, its analytical approach is
instructive to the arguments in favor of utilizing adolescent brain
neuroscience in the courtroom. 90 First, the district court fully
" Id. at 655.
186 Brown, supra note 87, at 1131-1132 (arguing that "the probative value of
functional brain imaging for mens rea" is limited).
187 United States v. Sandoval-Mendoza , 472 F. 3d at 656.
'88 United States v. Williams, No. CR 06-00079 DAE-KSC, 2009 WL 424583
(D. Haw. Feb. 20, 2009).
189 In Williams, the court denied the Government's motion to exclude expert
testimony based on "borderline intellectual functioning" offered by the
defendant at the guilt phase of trial. Id. at *19.
190 Defendant Williams was charged with the felony murder of his five-year-
old daughter while in the perpetration of child abuse. Id. at *1. The opinion
written by District Court Judge Ezra exemplifies the relatively rigid, yet
necessarily flexible application of the federal rules in the context of mental
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embraces the flexibility of the trial judge contemplated by Daubert
when it methodically examines each expert and his proffered
testimony under the two-prong analysis expressed by Daubert H.19 '
Judge Ezra references Daubert and other Ninth Circuit opinions as
support for his use of discretion when he states, "[we must]
... strike the appropriate balance between admitting reliable,
helpful expert testimony and excluding misleading or confusing
testimony to achieve the flexible approach."' 92
Judge Ezra's response to the Government's Federal Rules of
Evidence 702 and 403 challenges foreshadows the "gatekeepers"
undoubtedly ponderous task while appropriately characterizing it
as a "balance" that, in this author's view, must be achieved,
especially where evolving scientific evidence is at issue."3
Significant comparisons between the Williams analysis of
proffered testimony and that of a juvenile offender establish how
the trial court judge can permissibly admit expert witness
testimony based on adolescent brain imaging technology. 9 4 While
the expert witness testimony offered in Williams does not involve
health expert witness testimony offered to show that the Defendant suffers from
"borderline intellectual functioning" and brain damage. Id In this case, the
expert witness testimony is offered to establish that the Defendant did not have
the capacity to form the requisite intents of two charges:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury to
the daughter and (2) a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the person
of another or a threat to inflict injury upon the person of another which,
when coupled with an apparent present ability, causing a reasonable
apprehension of immediate bodily harm.
Id.
'' Id. First, the proffered testimony must reflect scientific knowledge that is
derived by scientific methods and whose work product amounts to "good
science." Id. at *3. Next, the proffered testimony is reliable if it "logically
advances a material aspect of the proposing party's case." Id. As Judge Ezra
sets forth the basis of his application, he devotes substantial time to quotations
that seemingly represent his philosophy on the "gatekeepers" charge that he
accepts as a trial court judge. Id.
192 Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Rincon, 28 F. 3d 921, 926 (9th Cir.
1994)).
1 Id. at *4.
I94 See id.
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brain imaging technology, Judge Ezra demonstrates the willingness
to "balance" the potential value of medical evidence presented by
the technology.'9 5
The court in Williams ultimately concludes that the
neuropsychologist's methods and testing procedures are reliable
and that the failure to administer a functional MRI does not
prevent the expert's testimony, but only pertains to its weight."'
Similarly, the trial judge can evaluate the expert testimony on the
extent of adolescent brain development, including opinions based
on functional MRI technology, without completely excluding such
testimony. Keep in mind that the functional MRI is not novel in its
use, but the use of images showing the adolescent brain functions
is.'97 The District Court in Williams also broadens what
"helpfulness" means to the fact finder when assessing the
admissibility of evidence. The court analyzes expert witness
testimony in the context of mens rea elements, and not pertaining
to establishment of a defense (infancy).
Nevertheless, the court's reasoning on the subject matter of the
expert testimony closely parallels the arguments made in favor of
admitting evidence on adolescent brain deficiency.'9 8 Even though
Judge Ezra acknowledges the Government's concern over expert
witness testimony that is not helpful to the jury, he views the
1 The court states, "Dr. Hall's testimony as to its [the functional MRI]
usefulness weighs heavily, as does Dr. Young's own admission that such tests
would be something she would find helpful in considering her [expert's]
diagnosis." Id. at 5. The Government requested that the Defendant undergo the
scan, and the court held that it would only order the procedure if both parties
agreed to it. Id. The Government also contended the neuropsychologist's failed
to conduct a QEEG (qualitative EEG) on defendant's brain. Id.
196 Id. at 6.
'" Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 89, at 282-85. fMRls are used for visual
encoding to determine the reproducibility of fMRI measurements during high
cognitive functioning, reproducibility of pre-surgical lateralization directed at
mapping brain areas involved with language processing and studying neural
correlates of psychological processes, how such processes develop over time in
learning and neuro-psychiatric disorders and used to predict the impact on
memory of temporal lobectomies. Id.
19' Williams, 2009 WL 424583 at *7.
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explanation of Defendant's capabilities as more important than a
specifically coded diagnosis.'9 9 The court states:
[W]hether [borderline intellectual functioning] is a symptom or a
formal diagnosis, its existence may help explain Defendant's
capabilities or lack thereof. If Defendant indeed suffers from sub-par
intellectual functioning, such a finding could seriously impact how he
comprehends situations and reacts to them.200
Specifically coded diagnoses are generally regarded as "helpful" to
the jury, and therefore, testimony is easier for the trier of fact to
integrate into their fact finding task. Nevertheless, Judge Ezra
appropriately considers the importance of the fact finder's basic
understanding of the defendant's capabilities in the absence of
specifically coded diagnoses.20'
In the case of juvenile offenders, expert witness testimony
based on adolescent brain imaging, likewise, provides the jury with
helpful information about the adolescents' range of cognition and
functioning as shown through brain imaging despite the fact that
this information is not readily tied to a specific disorder or DSM-
IV classification, which refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manuel of Mental Disorder published by the American Psychiatric
Association.202 When considering the evidence in light of
bolstering an Infancy Defense asserted by the population of
199 Id. The court considers the testimony despite the Government's challenge
that Defendant's asserted "condition" is not a recognizable "diagnosis" for
which the expert testimony would prove helpful to the jury in better
understanding the issue of mens rea capacity. Id.
200 Id. The court further explains that BIF constitutes a mental health
condition that may indicate general tendencies, but not necessarily a formal
diagnosis. However, this does not diminish the reliability of expert testimony as
to the specific nature of the condition. Id.
201 Even though the explanation of capabilities associated with the "diagnosis"
was more important than a specific identified disorder, the court required that
the defendant, at a minimum, produce a credible definition of "borderline
intellectual functioning." After responding to the court's request, the defendant
was still unable to successfully provide a reference that clearly set forth the
characteristics of borderline intellectual function in a manner that would not be
misleading. Reliability may not be tied to a specific diagnosis, but there must be
clarity in the expert's definition of "conditions" to which he testifies. Id. at 8.
202 Id. at 7.
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fourteen to eighteen-year-olds who are more likely to face adult
criminal sanctions, the testimony provides relevant information
that will help the jury assess potential exculpation.
Additionally, the district court develops an alternative to
exclusion of evidence that might otherwise appear to confuse the
jury. The potential for misunderstanding or confusion over a
psychological "condition" that cannot be clearly defined speaks to
the essential purpose of the evidentiary rules. Yet, Judge Ezra
approaches this quandary by employing an alternative to exclusion
that limits the allowable statements made by the expert about a
condition (BIF) so as not to suggest a formal or recognized
disorder, but only a description of certain abilities and
disabilities.203
With brain imaging technology, it will be important that a trial
court judge also focus more on the diagnostic tools used as the
basis of the expert's testimony about the adolescents' brain
development.2 04 The current imaging technology shows blood flow
activity in relevant portions of the brain as well as decreased or
minimal blood flow.205 The expert witness can testify to what
researchers and studies have shown about the images and brain
203 Id. at 9-10. The court cites to the Seventh and Ninth Circuit precedent in
United States v. Lamarre, 248 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2001) (allowing defendant's
expert to testify to his "borderline intellectual functioning" condition as
"scientifically valid social science" that can be showed to the jury) and United
States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing the defendant's expert
to testify that he lacked the requisite intent to defraud because he had an
"atypical belief system"). The District Court of Hawaii ultimately concludes
that the proffered testimony regarding the intellectual deficiencies associated
with BIF and the scientific testing that serves as the basis of the deficiencies has
attained sufficient acceptance within the community to satisfy the intent of
Daubert. Williams, 2009 WL 424583 at *9-10.
204 Williams, 2009 WL 424583, at *11. The Williams court espouses its
interpretation of Daubert principles indicating that the determination is less
about credibility and conclusions and more about reliability of the tools used as
the basis of the testimony. Id.
205Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 89, at 273-74.
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functioning.20 6 The tools are scientifically proven to reliably show
the regions of the brain. The trier of fact can assess application of
the normative standard and determine if the decreased functioning
in certain regions of the brain resulted in a deficient cognition
process sufficient to establish exculpation under the Infancy
Defense.
Finally, the District Court in Williams provides support for
admitting evidence that provides less than a concrete causal
connection for relevancy purposes. 207  The Williams court aptly
applies the relevance standard of expert witness testimony for a
mens rea defense that, likewise, applies for assessing the relevance
of testimony offered to show an exculpatory Infancy Defense.
Current brain imaging technology is not able to show a specific
individual's brain image nor can the technology render the type of
conclusions that must be drawn about an individual adolescent's
state of mind under legal standards.20 8 In asserting an Infancy
206 Rogers & DuBois, supra note 33, at 22-23 (explaining the present
potential uses of fMRI's such as using the images to explain neuroscience
evidence to laypersons).
207 When determining whether the expert testimony is relevant to the issue at
hand, Judge Ezra (citing to the Ninth Circuit precedent) notes that the causal
connection between the expert testimony and the mens rea issue is necessary,
especially in mental health disorder defenses. Williams, 2009 WL 424583 at
*11. Again, an important distinction exists between the mens rea defense and
exculpatory defenses in that the trier of fact may still find that the requisite state
of mind exists, but decide to allow for legal excuse of the defendant under the
facts. See generally Rogers & DuBois, supra note 33. Bearing that analytical
context in mind, one must appreciate this key difference between the legal
standard for establishing intent as opposed to proving cognitive abilities.
208 Brown & Murphy, supra note 87, at 1139. The authors argue that
functional magnetic resonance imaging ("fMRI") and other types of functional
brain imaging technologies are improperly introduced in criminal trials as
evidence of a defendant's past mental state, partly because the fMRI
methodology only measures neuronal activity indirectly. Id. The technology
shows individual brain anatomy that varies significantly, thereby making it
difficult to determine a correlation between parts of the brain in one person and
the standardized anatomical regions on the average structural brain image that is
used when the individual brain data is "warped" or normalized to map on to a 3-
D template brain structure. Id. Computer programs take the spatial data and
reconstruct it into an image using multiple regression statistical techniques and
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Defense, the juvenile defendant is offering the expert testimony to
show the function and deficiency of an adolescent brain for
cognitive assessment of right and wrong. Under Williams,
adolescent brain imaging technology can be admissible as an
established diagnostic tool that is relevant to the juvenile
offender's physiological brain capabilities and inform the trier of
fact as to its results despite sufficient causal connection.2 09
Comparably, this article asserts that the expert witness
testimony is relevant to the issue of wrongfulness in an Infancy
Defense and informs the trier of fact on a level of understanding
that science and technology has not previously afforded. The
knowledge is imperative to the adjudication and prosecution of
today's juvenile offender who is between fourteen and eighteen
since most jurisdictions have effectively turned the normative
standard for imposing legal responsibility on them away from any
acknowledgement of their "juvenile" status.210  The expert's
mathematical modeling. Id. This process is often invisible even to the
researcher, as it is done by software installed on the fMRI machine. Id.
209 In Williams, the expert was required to testify as to whether the
Defendant's mental or psychological condition impaired his ability to form
intent or inflict severe pain (elements of the charges). Williams, 2009 WL
424583 at *11. Under the Williams facts, the expert testified that BIF and brain
damage have only the "potential" to impact the Defendant's state of mind,
thereby making a tenuous causal connection. Id. But, Judge Ezra points out that
the testimony can still "inform[]" the jury. Id. at 12. Although the connection is
not apparent, Judge Ezra valued his testimony because it aided the trier of fact in
understanding characteristics of the Defendant. He states the following:
This court understands Dr. Young's testimony to mean that Defendant
has particular strengths and weaknesses which may be exacerbated in
certain situations.... [Accordingly] ... the jury will be able to take
Dr. Young's description of Defendant's weaknesses and disabilities
and consider those in light of the factual evidence put forth about the
particular circumstances surrounding the alleged abuse.
Id. at *11-12. Informing the jury can be more valuable than a tenuous causal
connection even if that causal connection serves as a guiding beacon for the trial
judge in determining whether the expert's testimony is pertinent to the case. Id.
210 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.556 (West 2008) (requiring the court to exercise an
involuntary mandatory waiver if the child was fourteen years of age or older and
the adjudication was for the commission of, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to
commit crimes such as murder, carjacking, or aggravated assault); OHIO REV.
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testimony pertains to the issue of cognition by describing specific
deficiencies that may operate under the facts presented where the
law"l' seeks to punish the juvenile offender as if he were an adult.
Jurors and judges operating as triers of fact most often make
experiential assumptions about adolescents and their behaviors. 21 2
However, adolescent brain imaging is reliable and relevant
information that further sculpts the basis for assessing exculpation
of the juvenile offender even when there is less than a direct causal
link between the expert's testimony and the brain images presented
at trial. With the evolving neuroscience that shows the capabilities
and function of the adolescent brain,213 the juvenile offender must
be allowed to meaningfully and fairly offer expert witness
testimony that will inform jurors beyond their previously held
assumptions.
Certainly the prosecutor in the adjudication and prosecution of
a juvenile offender will offer contrary expert testimony to refute
the juvenile offenders' claim of "infancy." The adversarial process
lends itself to this counterattack on the content of expert testimony
CODE ANN. § 2152.10 (LexisNexis 2002) (requires a transfer if the child was 14
or 15 at the time of the act, was previously adjudicated delinquent, and remained
in the custody of the department of youth services); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
134 (LexisNexis 2006) (allows the transfer of children 16 years of age and
younger if the child was charged with crimes such as first degree murder, rape,
aggravated robbery, and kidnapping); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02
(LexisNexis 1999) (gives the court discretion to transfer a child 14 years of age
or older if the alleged crime committed was a felony, but requires a transfer if
the child has been transferred previously and the alleged crime was a felony).
(Statutes are updated.)
211 Williams, 2009 WL 424583, at *12.
212 In Williams, the court reasoned that the expert testimony was relevant
because without it, the "average layperson juror" tends to operate under
assumptions of typical intellectual capability rather than being fully informed by
the expert's specialized knowledge. Id. at * 12. Likewise, our current normative
standards allow assumptions to operate for only seven or eight year olds in most
jurisdictions. Id Otherwise, a rebuttable presumption for those less than twelve
or fourteen must be proven. Id. This means we prosecute those less than
eighteen years old under certain assumptions about their cognitive and
experiential functioning abilities and then proceed to treat them as adults. Id.
213 Blakemore & Choudhury, supra note 115, at 296.
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particularly as it relates to scientific technology that may not have
previously disposed itself to this type of legal scrutiny. The
Daubert Court and subsequent lower courts like the district court
in Williams take a broad view of the conflicting, qualified
testimony by not assessing the credibility of opinions, but the
reliability of them based on the methods employed.2 14
E. The Exclusionary Sword and Establishing Adolescents'Acts of
Wrongfulness
Reliable and relevant evidence is still subject to exclusion if the
trial court judge determines that its probative value does not
outweigh its tendency to mislead the jury or confuse the issues
through application of the exclusionary rule standards of Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE) 403.215 Notwithstanding the sensitivities
and concerns surrounding scientific methods and testing, the
District Court in Williams does not shy away from the nature of
scientific evidence, but instead rests on the court's discretion
granted by U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert.2 16 The states should,
likewise, embrace the parameters of evidentiary analysis that
embodies the practice and policy of the Daubert evidentiary
standards for admitting expert witness testimony based on
scientific evidence.
This article advocates for the same flexible approach used by
the Williams court when admitting expert witness testimony based
on adolescent brain imaging offered to exculpate juvenile
offenders under an Infancy Defense. Such expert witness
testimony is probative to a modified Infancy Defense since it
21 Williams, 2009 WL 424583, at * 14.
215 FED. R. EvID. 403.
216 After consulting U.S. Supreme Court precedent on challenges to a state
statute prohibiting admissibility of mental health testimony, the Williams court
found the probative value of expert witness testimony regarding BIF and its
impact on Defendant's ability to reason and learn from experience to
significantly outweigh any potential jury confusion. Williams, 2009 WL 424583
at *13. Emphasizing the reliability of the expert's testimony that has bearing on
the mens rea element and acknowledging the imprecision of mental health
diagnosis, the Williams court ultimately depended heavily on the "broad
latitude" granted to trial court judges by Daubert. Id. at * 13, * 19.
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addresses the grounds for exculpation when factors such as the
juvenile defendant's cognitive ability and corresponding
behavioral response is at issue. Experts can testify to the known
boundaries of adolescent brain development and the associated
behavioral characteristics. 217  Because the states' transfer laws
allow for prosecution of the youngest members of the adolescent
population, expert testimony pertaining to the cognition and
behavior processes of these potential juvenile offenders is highly
relevant.
Additionally, the expert testimony can inform the jury about
the brain functioning and deficiencies of fourteen to eighteen year
olds in jurisdictions where the common law presumption of
infancy is interpreted by the courts so as to legislatively abrogate
the defense.218  Moreover, we have seen that even the U.S.
Supreme Court entertained adolescent brain imaging technology as
relevant to the issue of Eighth Amendment protection from capital
punishment.2 19 Certainly the states' courts can, at common law,
permit juvenile offenders to have a constitutionally mandated
meaningful defense where the expert witness testimony is offered
to establish "infancy."
The solution must occur at common law under the
constitutional guarantee of a juvenile defendant's right to a
meaningful defense. The states' legislature may proscribe where
the juvenile offender is held legally responsible for his actions
(juvenile court adjudication or criminal court prosecution), but the
courts must ensure a meaningful defense when placement of
youths' legal responsibility is at issue. If we continue to legislate
217 See generally Maroney, supra note 33 (analyzing cases where experts used
developmental neuroscience to argue diminished cognitive capacity).
218 W.D.B. v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2007) (determining
that the legislative purpose enunciated in the juvenile code along with
subsequently enacted comprehensive legislation indicates the jurisdiction's
intent not to codify the presumption and the courts, therefore, have no authority
to judicially create the defense).
219 See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that it was
unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to death based on their lessened
blameworthiness).
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away adolescence through transfer laws, then we must not ignore
the juvenile defendant's assertion of a meaningful defense that
includes offering information to the trier of fact on the exculpatory
issue of infancy. Juveniles can offer adolescent brain technology
in the context of the states' existing Infancy Defense models.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF ADOLESCENT BRAIN IMAGING
OFFERED UNDER A COMMON LAW INFANCY DEFENSE: AN
EXAMINATION OF WASHINGTON, KENTUCKY, AND CALIFORNIA
A. Sex Crimes Committed by Juveniles
A juvenile defendant must be allowed to offer evidence of
adolescent brain function in cases where a defense of youthful
incapacity involves the adolescent's ability to differentiate between
wrong and right sexual conduct. The common law defense of
infancy that is bolstered by adolescent brain imaging must prevail
even when the states' legislature seeks to abrogate its operation.
Sexual conduct with others presents one of the most compelling
cases for considering not only major developmental differences
between adolescents and adults, but also a defense under which
these key differences are the focal point for imposing the
appropriate legal standard of criminal culpability. In the ordinary
course, sexual conduct is not "misconduct" or criminal if it occurs
between the appropriate people and under the appropriate
circumstances.220 Washington and Kentucky provide illustration of
these points in the context of juveniles charged with sex crimes.
1. Washington
In State v. Ramer,22' the Washington Supreme Court
recognized the complexities entailed when assessing the child's
220 See Gary Chartier, Natural Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Politics of
Virtue, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1593, 1630-31 (2001) (discussing ethical
ramifications of departure from the norms governing sexual conduct and the
moral appropriateness of same-sex marriages).
221 State v. Ramer, 86 P.3d 132 (Wa. 2004) (holding that the State failed to
overcome the presumption that the child lacked capacity to commit first degree
rape). In addition to codifying its Infancy Defense, Washington utilizes a
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capacity to commit a crime. 2 22 This case involved an 1 1-year-old
juvenile defendant who was charged with first degree rape of a
child. The juvenile defendant, Ramer, was accused of sexual
misconduct with a younger child in the home of his mother's
friend. At a hearing to determine Ramer's capacity to commit first
degree rape,2 the defense counsel offered two expert witnesses.224
Each testified that Ramer did not understand the act of having
sexual contact with the younger child nor did he understand why
common law interpretation of how the defense should be applied through
consideration of the following seven factors for determining capacity:
(1) the nature of the crime, (2) the child's age and maturity, (3) whether
the child evidenced a desire for secrecy, (4) whether the child told the
victim (if any) not to tell, (5) prior conduct similar to that charged, (6)
any consequences that attached to that prior conduct, and (7) whether
the child had made an acknowledgment that the behavior is wrong and
could lead to detention. Expert witness testimony that explains
adolescent brain imaging can be used to augment the understanding
and application of each of these factors.
Id. at 136-37.
222 Washington statute provides in part that: "[c]hildren of eight and under
twelve years of age are presumed to be incapable of committing the crime."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.04.050 (West 2009). This presumption may be
removed by proof that they have "sufficient capacity to understand the act or
neglect, and to know that it was wrong." The state overcomes this presumption
through clear and convincing evidence that the child had sufficient capacity to
understand the act and to know that it was wrong. Ramer, 86 P.3d at 138.
223 After a hearing held on the capacity of the child to commit the crime, the
Superior Court Judge Pomeroy found that Ramer was "a highly sexualized
young person, who clearly was confused about appropriate sexual behaviors and
could not understand the prohibitions on sexual behavior with other children."
Id. at 135. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Washington Supreme Court
granted discretionary review. Id. After detailed examination of the trial record,
the Washington Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals improperly
determined that the State did not fail to overcome the statutory presumption by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 138.
224 The two experts, Dr. Brett Trowbridge, Ph.D., J.D., a forensic
psychologist, licensed attorney, and former prosecutor, and Peg Cain, M.A., a
mental health specialist, both testified after evaluating Ramer and preparing
written reports. Dr. Trowbridge opined that Ramer did not understand the act
charged, nor did he understand how conduct enjoyed by someone else could be
wrong (much less illegal). Id. at 137-38.
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his contact amounted to criminal activity called "rape." 225 At this
point, expert witness testimony based on adolescent brain imaging
would be used by the juvenile defendant to show the brain capacity
of a defendant like Ramer and his limitations in making judgments
about appropriate sexual conduct when, as Ramer stated, "[i]t
wasn't wrong because he was into it too." 22 6
With regard to sex crimes, the courts have held that, "when a
juvenile is charged with a sex crime, the State carries a greater
burden of proof in showing that the child understood the illegality
of the act." 227  Consequently, it becomes more difficult to prove
that the child understood the wrongfulness of his acts. In Ramer,
the court noted that the nature of the crime is an important factor,
but with sex crimes it is very difficult to tell if a child understands
the prohibitions on sexual behavior with other children.2 28
225 Additionally, Dr. Cain's testimony, based on her observations of Ramer's
attitude and demeanor during the evaluation, indicated that he did not appreciate
the inappropriateness or wrongfulness of sexual contact under these
circumstances because when the younger child's mother first questioned Ramer
about the incident, he "freely admitted" his behavior. Id. at 134. Likewise,
when the detective initially asked him if he believed that what he had done with
the younger child was wrong, Ramer equivocated, responding, "kind of sort of
wrong." Id. Then later, he qualified his answer by stating, "[i]t wasn't wrong
because he was into it too." Id. The specialists' conclusions consistently
confirmed that Ramer believed that it was not wrong to have sexual conduct
with a younger child if the other child enjoyed and voluntarily participated in the
act. Id. Moreover, if the other child voluntarily participates, Ramer failed to
comprehend why it was considered "rape".
226 Id. at 134.
227 Id. at 137.
228 The prosecution presented its expert witness, Thomas Nore, M.S.W., a
juvenile probation counselor who had twenty-six years of experience in his
position, but had not conducted an evaluation of Ramer. Id. at 135. Nore
testified that he believed Ramer understood the wrongfulness of his conduct
based on instruction from Ramer's parents. Id. He also indicated that "Ramer
had been told by his parents that 'sexual contact with each other in the home or
anyone else' was wrong." Id. at 135. Nore further opined that Ramer "had
knowledge and experience far beyond any 11 year old I'd ever met. In fact far
beyond some 16-, 17-year-olds." Id. Therefore, Ramer knew the serious
consequences of sexual contact and had the capacity to commit the crime. Id.
At this point, expert witness testimony based on adolescent brain imaging would
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Adolescent brain imaging research provides relevant information
about a preadolescent's capacity to make judgments and weigh the
consequences of sexual behavior. The information assists the trier
of fact regarding their deficiencies in understanding and
distinguishing the inappropriateness of criminal conduct.
Ramer provides a classic example of how children's perception
and conduct in situations requiring assessment of moral issues
(especially complex ones like sexual conduct) can be improperly
impacted by collateral influences. Adults are more often resolved
in their convictions about what is right and wrong after considering
all justifications and rationalizations that often impact their
decisions. Adolescents, however, rarely possess the capacity to
even consider, much less discern the rightfulness or wrongfulness,
of justifications and rationalizations surrounding their conduct.22 9
Adolescent brain imaging research informs the trier of fact on the
relevant issue of a juvenile's capacity and decision making
processes at the neurological level.230
Information about adolescent brain maturity may be most
useful in cases involving decisions and judgments about sexually
appropriate conduct for a prepubescent or adolescent child. One's
exercise of proper judgment, assessment of risks, and management
of emotions truly define the boundaries between criminal and non-
criminal conduct. While most judgments about sexual conduct
among adolescents do not lead to criminally culpable conduct, it is
an area where an adolescent's decisions are largely driven by his
emotions and inability to properly perceive the corresponding
be used by the juvenile defendant to show the brain capacity of a defendant like
Ramer and his limitations in making judgments about appropriate sexual
conduct when, as Ramer stated, "[i]t wasn't wrong because he was into it too."
Id. at 134.
229 Id. at 137 The Washington Supreme Court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence for the superior court to find that the State failed to establish
that Ramer knew the wrongfulness of his actions based on the testimony offered
by the case detective and the psychiatrist, one who waivered in their
determination of the defendant's capacity and the other who opined that Ramer
did not have the capacity to understand the illegality of his sexual misconduct.
230 See Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty,
supra note 34, at 120.
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risks.2 3 1 In cases like Ramer, where the sexual contact between two
underage children amounts to potentially criminal culpability, the
modified Infancy Defense put forth in this article would allow the
juvenile defendant to meaningfully defend himself by offering
adolescent brain imaging to inform the fact finder as to the extent
of his ability to govern himself appropriately.
2. Kentucky
Kentucky has abolished the use of the Infancy Defense at
common law under the guise of juvenile court rehabilitative
theory.232 Such jurisdictions must reconsider how the proposed
Infancy Defense model can amplify our understanding of juvenile
criminal culpability. Mental capability defines the parameters of
prosecutors and defense counsels' arguments in criminal cases. 233
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in W.D.B v. Commonwealth234
abrogated the common law Infancy Defense in juvenile court235 in
a case where a twelve-year-old was adjudicated delinquent on the
offense of first-degree sexual abuse of a three-year-old victim. 236
231 See Johndro, supra note 17, at 347 (explaining how the adolescents'
decision making capacity and their behavior-control ability is deficient because
their choices are emotionally charged based on the dynamics of group pressures
that may encourage participation in criminal activity). See also Elizabeth S.
Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REv. 799 814-815
(2003) (explaining that research evidence supports the difference in perception
of and attitudes toward risk when comparing adolescents to adults concluding
that adolescents and young adults generally take more health and safety risks
than do older adults by engaging more frequently in behaviors such as
unprotected sex).
232 W.D.B. v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Ky. 2007).
233 Rogers & DuBois, supra note 33, at 18.
234 246 S.W.3d 448.
235 The following cases have also ruled similarly: Connecticut in In re
Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989); Pennsylvania in In re G.T., 597 A.2d 638
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Rhode Island in In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180, 1183 (R.I.
1981) (holding that in proceedings in which juveniles are found delinquent or
wayward, "there is no necessity for finding that the juvenile had such maturity
that he or she knew what he or she was doing was wrong").
236 W.D.B., 246 S.W.3d at 450. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the
District Court decision prohibiting application of a common law presumption
where an eight year old boy fondled a three year old behind a shed. The district
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The court expressly denounced judicial decision making on policy
grounds where the legislature has stated its purposes in the absence
of codifying the Infancy Defense presumption.2 37 Its approach
presents a compelling scenario in favor of applying an Infancy
Defense model using adolescent brain science that operates in the
absence of a presumption but bolsters expert opinion testimony
that is pertinent to the court's determination of "capacity."
Because the history of juvenile court reform is founded in
legislative movement by the states, the courts abdicate the task of
common law presumption.238
In this case, W.D.B.'s adjudication in juvenile court depended
on whether he had the capacity to know between right and wrong;
however, when he argued that the common law presumption of
infancy applied, the court determined that Kentucky juvenile code
provisions governed instead. 239 Therefore, when the juvenile does
not operate under the presumption that he lacks criminal capacity,
then the court assumes his capacity is the same as an adult's. 240
The ruling from this case exemplifies why the courts should extend
the evidentiary rules to accommodate the modified Infancy
Defense model proposed here. In a policy argument asserting that
a presumption of incapacity protects children from the prosecution
establishing criminal mental state, W.D.B. asserted the Infancy
Defense during the adjudication hearing which is the functional
equivalent in juvenile court to the guilt/innocence phase of a
court had sentenced the defendant as a juvenile sex offender under KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 635.5 10 (LexisNexis 2008).
237 W.D.B., 246 S.W.3d at 451-452.
238 id.
239 Id. at 452. The Supreme Court of Kentucky was unwilling to rule on what
they deemed to be a policy argument once the Kentucky legislature enacted a
comprehensive Juvenile Code that did not specifically provide for the infancy
defense. The Court viewed application of the common law presumption as
countering the clinical and rehabilitative purposes of the Juvenile Code. Id. at
450.
240 Id. at 449-51 (explaining the creation of a common law youthful
incapacity presumption in Kentucky and subsequent enactment of extensive
Juvenile Code provisions that explicitly omit the presumption).
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criminal trial.241 He argued that allowing assertion of the Infancy
Defense (i.e., lack of criminal capacity) at this stage would then
require proof by the prosecution of his mental state.242
Even though the court determined that W.D.B. knew the
difference between right and wrong, the state still had to establish
its burden on the legal elements of mens rea.243 Under a modified
Infancy Defense, the juvenile defendant offers the defense of
incapacity separate from establishing the mens rea elements,
circumstantially, and sans out-of-court confessions. There would
be no presumption in favor of the juvenile defendant which means
that the prosecution can refute the capacity determination with its
own evidence. If the juvenile defendant is successful in
establishing incapacity, then the case ends. However, if
unsuccessful, the prosecution would carry the burden on the
separate determination of criminal intent.
Consider the value added to a juvenile defendant's meaningful
defense based on a procedural variation under the W.D.B. facts
where, in addition to the expert testimony from the
neuropsychologist, there would be expert testimony based on
adolescent brain imaging technology offered on the issue of
"capacity" between right and wrong. Before reaching the issue of
criminal mental state, the expert would provide additional relevant
information on what science tells us about adolescent brain
deficiencies for the trier of fact to consider in light of the facts and
the juvenile offender's out of court confession. In the proposed
model, however, the juvenile defendant must establish the Infancy
Defense in the absence of a presumption.
241 Id. at 452.
242 Id. at 452.
243 Id. The prosecution ultimately established its burden circumstantially
through the combined out of court confession of W.D.B. that was corroborated
by the circumstances of the crime. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that there
was no error committed by the trial court because W.D.B.'s confession, the
father's testimony, and the facts surrounding the incident were sufficient. The
court also reasoned that the nature of the offense did not yield physical
evidence; therefore, making it acceptable to corroborate the circumstances of the
crime. Id. at 456.
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
The expert testimony based on adolescent brain imaging would
aid the trier of fact just like the testimony offered by the
neuropsychologist in W.D.B. who testified to his mental health
diagnoses. Just as the expert opinion testimony is relevant in such
cases, the scientific evidence of adolescent brain imaging qualifies
our understanding of how adolescents like W.D.B. process their
"knowledge" of right and wrong.
B. A Juvenile's "Admission ofKnowledge"
1. California
Admitting testimony on the cognitive function of the
adolescent brain assists the trier of fact in determining an
adolescent's admitted "knowledge" under the facts. In some cases,
juvenile offenders will be unable to support an Infancy Defense
based on expert witness testimony when other compelling evidence
like their admissions of wrongful conduct is offered to suggest a
heightened cognitive function.244 A fair and meaningful defense,
however, must include not only what experiential evidence
provides, but also what relevant scientific evidence reveals about
the adolescent's cognitive immaturity and lack of appreciation for
wrongful activity.245
The Court of Appeals in California recently applied their
infancy and insanity defense statute246 in In re Shawn J,247 where it
244 See State v. Bell, 80 P.3d 367, 376 (2003). The Supreme Court of Kansas
cautiously considered a juvenile's confession by stating that: "[w]here the
accused is a juvenile ... this court exercises the greatest care in assessing the
validity of the confession. In determining whether a confession is voluntary,
consideration is given to the totality of the circumstances and great reliance is
placed upon the finder of fact." Id. Relevant scientific evidence of the
adolescent brain comprises the totality of circumstances when the trier of fact
determines the juvenile's admitted "knowledge." Id.
245 See Lucy C. Ferguson, The Implications of Developmental Cognitive
Research on "Evolving Standards of Decency" and the Imposition of the Death
Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 441, 458 (2004) (discussing how
scientific findings of diminished capacity, when coupled with other exacerbating
factors such as abuse and neglect, explain juvenile cognitive immaturity).
246 CAL. PEN. CODE § 26 (West 2010). Under the California Code, infancy
and insanity defenses are provided in section 26 which, in pertinent part, states:
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examined the Infancy Defense as it applies to cases brought under
section 602 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.24 8
Under the statute, even though children under the age of eighteen
are generally within the juvenile court's jurisdiction, if a child over
the age of fourteen is charged with certain more severe crimes, he
is prosecuted in adult court. Shawn J. originated from an order of
wardship involving a juvenile offender who was eleven years old
when he shot another minor with a BB gun.249 The case involved
"Persons capable of committing crime; exceptions. All persons are capable of
committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: (1) Children
under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing
the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness. (2) Persons who are
mentally incapacitated."
247 In Re Shawn J., No. B207843, 2009 WL 1758930 at *1-*4, *2 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 23, 2009) (holding that the juvenile's admission waived his right to
appeal the prosecution's evidence). In his appeal, Shawn J. asserted that the
prosecution had failed to meet its statutorily imposed burden to overcome the
presumption of infancy. Id. At first glance, the presumption and the "clear
proof' as a heightened burden appear to work to the advantage of the juvenile
offender. Id. The juvenile offender asserts the insufficiency of evidence
challenge in the context of what is determined to be a "permissible" waiver of
his rights and a legal "admission" to the alleged crime. Id. In the admission
statements, the juvenile offender makes affirmations pertaining to the issue of
knowledge between right and wrong under the Infancy Defense. Id.
Additionally, the admission is equal to a guilty plea that cannot be challenged
under precedent based on the insufficiency of evidence. Id. at *3.
248 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 2010). The California statute
outlines jurisdictional limits of the juvenile court as well as the adult criminal
court based on the alleged offenses. Section 602 provides, in pertinent part, "(a)
Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person who is under the age of 18
years when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any
ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an
ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court. (b)
Any person who is alleged, when he or she was 14 years of age or older, to have
committed one of the following offenses shall be prosecuted under the general
law in a court of criminal jurisdiction [murder and various sex offenses]." Id.
249 In re Shawn J., 2009 WL 1758930 at *1. The Prosecution rebutted the
presumption of infancy by offering the statements made by Shawn J. where he
admitted the charge. Id. He stated that his parents had taught him the difference
between "doing what's right and wrong," and that he knew it was wrong to shoot
someone with a BB gun. Id. With this admission, California applied its rules of
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not only application of the Infancy Defense, but also the juvenile
offender's admission about his knowledge of wrongful conduct.
The case exemplifies in many respects the reasons why juvenile
offenders must be able to assert a modified common law Infancy
Defense that considers adolescent brain development.
Here, the prosecution was "deemed" to have sufficient
evidence based on the juvenile's admission statements to overcome
the presumption and prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.250
Shawn J. was, therefore, unable to challenge on appeal the
sufficiency of evidence that was "deemed" rather than actually
offered.25 ' His "admission" that he knew the wrongfulness of his
actions formulated the basis of the prosecution's argument on
rebuttal. The problem here is the entanglement of legal process
that essentially obviated the juvenile offender's right to
meaningfully offer "adolescence" as a defense. As a matter of
policy, we must ask whether we want to modify our normative
standards for imposing criminal responsibility on adolescents
under these circumstances, if at all.
Consider whether an expert's testimony as to adolescent
vulnerability and susceptibility to coercion confirms or diminishes
his own admission regarding his improper or illegal conduct.252
criminal procedure that treat the plea as, "a judicial admission of every element
of the offense charged. . . serves as a stipulation that the People need introduce
no proof whatever to support the accusation. . . ." Id. at *2.
250 Id. at *2. The court explained that the juvenile's confession was "itself a
conviction." Id.
251 Id. The trial court relied upon the adolescent's admissions as "substantial
proof.. . of requisite knowledge."
252 See Shepherd, supra note 91, at 51. The author observes how adolescents
tend to be easily influenced in police interrogations. He states:
[adolescents are] ... inherently more vulnerable than adults to the
processes of police investigations, and to the procedures of trial and
sentencing ... [and that] the techniques widely used in police
encounters with teenagers, combined with the adolescent's
psychological and neurological vulnerability, make them more likely to
consent to police intrusions into their liberty and to break down during
police interrogations, and even lead to false confessions that result in
the conviction of the innocent.
Id.
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Probably any parent can attest to some level of their adolescent's
admission of wrongfulness and knowledge of it at the time of an
offense. The question becomes whether the parent or society still
holds them responsible on any level for their bad decision. When
viewed more broadly, we can see that California's interpretation
and disposition of the Infancy Defense was based on the juvenile's
statements of admission and the value of these statements as
"sufficient" evidence to counter the presumption of infancy. In
effect, the operable rule of criminal procedure robbed the
California juvenile defendant of an opportunity to meaningfully
assert relevant testimony on the issue of his "knowledge." Even if
we assume ideal compliance with Fifth Amendment protections
and confession laws, the legal process of In re Shawn J buttresses
the argument made here for a modified Infancy Defense law that
allows for full consideration of relevant evidence on the issue of
the juvenile offender's cognition and level of function.
While the evidence is subject to prosecutorial rebuttal, the
proposed Infancy Defense model advocated in this article avoids
circumventing the inquiry into levels of cognitive function through
statements made by the juvenile offender "admitting" to his
knowledge. A juvenile's admission may still operate to
conclusively support the elements of the charge, but it would not
be applied as evidence of his cognitive function.25 3 As long as our
legal system currently punishes all individuals based on some
knowledge of their acts and satisfaction of other relevant criminal
elements, we must allow, at common law, for a juvenile offender
to qualify what it means for an adolescent to "know" about
wrongfulness and still engage in illegal behavior. Under the
current legislative and common law scheme explained in In re
Shawn J, California may provide for the Infancy Defense, but
operation of other criminal procedures effectively squelches its
consideration.254
253See In Re Shawn J., 2009 WL 1758930 at *3 (referring to California
precedent where a plea is judicial admission to the elements of a crime).
254 Id The appellate court held that the juvenile's admission waived his right
to appellate challenges to the People's evidence. Id.
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One might question under In re Shawn J. why it is necessary
for a juvenile court judge to consider the Infancy Defense when
disposition involved his continual wardship of the court for some
unknown rehabilitative plan or possible detention.255 Some may
find that successful assertion of the proposed Infancy Defense
amounts to a perceived injustice and, at a minimum, shocks the
conscience. While exculpation of the juvenile offender in In re
Shawn J might garner such a response, there are cases where
perhaps proof of the juvenile defendant's offense is less evident.
And, if the Infancy Defense had successfully been asserted with
admission of expert witness testimony, then Shawn J. would have
escaped sanction for firing the BB gun.
This article does not advocate for a categorical excuse of
adolescent criminal responsibility.256 However, in cases where
juveniles are subject to harsher sentencing schemes that can be
imposed in state juvenile courts as well as adult criminal courts, we
must afford the adolescent some legally permissible vehicle by
which he can offer an exculpatory defense that considers pertinent
information of deficient brain functioning. Perhaps the "Shawn
J.'s" of this world should endure the consequence of "bad
decision-making" notwithstanding adolescent brain deficiencies.
However, where adolescents who commit more serious offenses
face sentencing schemes like those imposed on adults, the law
must afford them opportunity to assert their status as an adolescent.
The Infancy Defense model proposed here allows for reliable
scientific information that is relevant to the juvenile's "knowledge"
and acts of wrongfulness. Adults who commit the most egregious
crimes can afford themselves of all types of relevant defenses that,
if successful, exculpate or mitigate their crimes. There is no
greater offense to our sensibilities than to ignore consideration of
255 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 2010). Under California's
jurisdictional statute, absent murder and various sex offenses, the juvenile court
judge would ideally impose sanctions that are in accordance with the crime. Id.
256 See Bazelon, supra note 8, at 169. The author recognizes that the common
law Infancy Defense can operate to prevent legal consequence for the child's
wrongdoing.
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those scientific facts, which explain and substantiate different
treatment of children under the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court encourages us to re-evaluate our
normative standards for imposing criminal liability on adolescents
whose diminished culpability markedly distinguished them from
adults.257 Under a modified Infancy Defense, courts should
consider how their diminished culpability is evidenced by studies
of the adolescent brain which show regions that, more likely than
not, govern their decision-making capacity. 25 8  Admitting
adolescent brain studies is especially necessary to the meaningful
defense of the juvenile when fourteen to eighteen year olds are
most likely to be treated as adults under current transfer and
certification laws. 259 Even further, the cognitive maturity level of
the average juvenile offender between the ages of eleven and
fourteen is oftentimes well below their chronological age.260
Consequently, perhaps exculpation from criminal liability is
warranted even where a level of cognition exists. A meaningful
defense formulates the groundwork for a fair trial where the
juvenile defendant is allowed to offer evidence for purposes of
257 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005).
258 Kaban, supra note 9 at 47.
259 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 635.020(4) (requiring juveniles fourteen years of age
and older charged with using firearms in the commission of felonies to be tried
as adults). Nonetheless, in California, for example, the Infancy Defense model
is limited to those under the age of fourteen who are not subjected to adult
criminal court prosecution based on certain delineated offenses. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 602 (West 2010).
260 See Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial
in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings-Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-
Client Relationship, 33 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 647 (1995) ("[the
cognitive maturity level below the juvenile's chronological age] is important to
the child's ability to understand the proceedings and the nature of the charges
against him or her. But it is even more critical to the child's inability to consult
with counsel and to assist in his or her defense. A juvenile functioning at this
level of cognitive maturity may be ill-equipped to understand the various




assessing his capacity to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of his
action.
The defense would be asserted without the presumption of
"incapacity" or "knowledge" of right and wrong currently present
in most states. Instead, the prosecution and defense would be on
equal footing as to the burden of establishing and refuting
sufficient evidence. Operation of the Infancy Defense means that
the jury will consider whether to proceed with imposing criminal
responsibility under the facts and the alleged charge. Prosecutors
must then refute the affirmative defense. Ultimately, the
mechanisms of adversarial process would fully operate to
determine whether criminal responsibility should be imposed. The
primary difference is that the juvenile's affirmative defense is
more meaningful when asserted based on expert testimony
regarding their cognitive brain function.261
Many jurisdictions have abrogated the statutory Infancy
Defense, thereby exposing juveniles to prosecution and/or
sentencing as if they were adults.262 As a result, fewer assertions of
exculpation from legal responsibility have been made by juvenile
offenders.263 In the absence of statutory Infancy Defense models, it
is incumbent upon judges at common law to expand their
evidentiary rule interpretation of the "gatekeeper" and allow the
expert testimony to be admitted as probative on the pertinent issue
of criminal responsibility. This author advances the argument that
261 Duke T. Oishi, A Piece of Mind for Peace of Mind: Federal
Discoverability of Opinion Work Product Provided to Expert Witnesses and Its
Implications in Hawai'i, 24 U. HAW. L. REv. 859, 878 (2002) (explaining the
importance of expert witness when the fact finder must assess subjects outside
their common knowledge). In order to appreciate a juvenile's cognitive brain
function through the scientific data that provides measure, an expert must
provide testimony as part of the juvenile's affirmative defense. Id.
262 W.D.B. v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Ky. 2007) (discussing a
Kentucky Supreme Court case as illustration of abrogation of the common law
Infancy Defense). See also Beale, supra note 20, at 520-21.
263 Many Infancy Defense cases were decided before 1990, during a time
when less punitive measures predominated our juvenile justice and criminal
systems. Kaban, supra note 9, at 55-56.
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notions for fundamental fairness minimally require that the
juvenile offender be allowed to offer this information264 even
though several commentators dispute the injection of scientific
evidence in the courtroom that attempts to connect adolescent
brain development to legal excuse or culpability.265
We can speculate as to whether the law should formulate
categorical rules or evaluate case-by-case exceptions, but at some
point we must involve reliable and relevant scientific technology in
the adversarial process to evaluate imposition of criminal
responsibility. The courts at common law are designed to fairly
ferret out disagreement over imposition or excuse from liability
without waiting for the legislature to make categorical
determinations. Trial court judges must fairly consider scientific
factors that influence adolescents' cognitive capacity so that the
adjudication and prosecution of juvenile offenders reflects our
knowledge of childhood development.
264 See generally Scott & Steinberg, supra note 231 (supporting consideration
of scientific evidence to mitigate criminal liability).
265 See Tancredi, supra note 89, at 293-294 (detailing some of the technical
inherent limitations of the fMRI and difficulties of using fMRI images to draw
legal conclusions. Specifically, the image does not explain an individual's
violent behavior which is critical for imputing responsibility. The inability to
infer causal relationships based on the images presents a major limitation on its
use in the courtroom). See also Brown, supra note 87, at 1183-84 (questioning
the use of fMRI images in the courtroom to determine the individual's degree of
culpability in mens rea claims when the technology is based on averaged data
that compares the individual to a group). Nevertheless, the article does not
completely deny use of the technology in the courtroom, but instead, favors use
of Rule 403 that excludes prejudicial evidence or evidence lacking probative
value, rather than Daubert (or similar) rules governing scientific evidence. See
also Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 40, 41-42 (1997) (positing that children clearly act
intentionally, therefore, morality and the law seeks to excuse their behavior as
intentional and purposeful. While juveniles make choices, oftentimes, they
reflect their lack of experience and knowledge of the full range of potential
choices in any given circumstance. Regardless, their actions are intentional and
are not excused because they are unintentional. And, lack of mental capacity to
make a choice does not justify excuse).
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If juvenile offenders are to be truly considered less
blameworthy than adults, preservation of the Infancy Defense is
crucial.266 This is true even when they should be held accountable
for their actions. Adolescent brain imaging technology informs us
on essential differences between how adults make decisions
regarding their conduct as distinct from adolescents.267
Incorporating the technology into a modified Infancy Defense
model provides the fact finder with the data necessary to determine
adolescent criminal capacity. A more in-depth determination of
the differences between adolescents and adults can direct the
standard by which we impose criminal sanctions.268 While
adolescents often know the wrongfulness of their actions, our
normative legal standards should appropriately absolve them from
criminal responsibility when adolescent brain imaging can guard
lawmakers and society against overestimation of their criminal
culpability.
266 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 591 (2005).
267 While adults use their prefrontal cortex to process information, teenagers
use their amygdala because their prefrontal cortex is not mature. In fact, it is the
last area of the brain to mature and is the one responsible with "risk assessment,
impulse control, behavior regulation, and moral reasoning." Kaban, supra note
9, at 48.
268 One author suggests that we assess an adolescent's decision making ability
on the following three categories established by a developmental psychologist:
(1) responsibility, which includes autonomy and independence of thought; (2)
temperance, which contemplates the ability to limit impulsiveness; and (3)
perspective, which focuses on an individual's ability to frame a particular
decision in a larger context. Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States Of
Development, 14 STAN. L & POL'Y REv 143, 156 (2003). The author advocates
for a more in-depth dialogue about the fundamental developmental differences
between children and adults in their treatment under the criminal justice system.
She also describes the views of our criminal justice system regarding adolescent
offenders as based largely on an "overestimation of [the adolescents'] decision-
making capacities. . . ." Id. at 172.
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